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REMOVING A BRICK FROM THE JEFFERSONIAN WALL OF
SEPARATIONISM: A PER SE RULE FOR PRIVATE
RELIGIOUS SPEECH IN PUBLIC FORA
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette
I. INTRODUCTION
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, made binding
upon the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that the
government "shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."1
The First Amendment also establishes, however, that private religious
speech is fully protected by the United States Constitution.2 This tension,
inherent in Establishment Clause analysis, has manifested itself in an array
of conflicting judicial decisions regarding private religious expression in
the public forum.3
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." Id.
2. Id. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment protects private ex-
pression, while the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment specifically pro-
tects private religious expression. Id.
One commentator has argued that the text of the First Amendment must be
given controlling authority in Establishment Clause cases. Kevin D. Evans, Beyond
Neutralism: A Suggested Historically Justifiable Approach to Establishment Clause Analysis,
64 ST. JOHN'S L. RiEv. 41 (1989). He writes:
Given the paramount nature of the Constitution and the fact that the
document itself prescribes the method for constitutional change, the
proper interpretive role must be limited to determining the constitution-
ality of novel ideas and circumstances against a constant constitutional
backdrop, i.e., the intended meaning of the relevant constitutional provi-
sion, rather than current societal beliefs and the "intellectual predisposi-
tion" of court members.
Id. at 42 (footnote omitted). Evans argues that varying societal perceptions, fact-
specific situations and judicial predisposition should not cloud the actual meaning
of the clauses contained in the First Amendment, as defined by the text of the
document itself. Id. Thus, all questions regarding First Amendment interpreta-
tion should be addressed against a backdrop of textual understanding. Id. For a
further discussion of the history of the First Amendment and the significance of
such an understanding, see infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
3. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2494 (1994)
(determining that New York statute creating special school district following village
lines of community, which excluded all but its religious practitioners, violated Es-
tablishment Clause); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113
S. Ct. 2141, 2148-49 (1993) (finding school district's refusal to allow showing of
religious film after school hours on district property unconstitutional under First
Amendment); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992) (stating that public
school graduation practice of having nonsectarian prayers given by members of
(559)
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Varying interpretations of the interplay between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Speech and Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment
have resulted in a multitude of dissimilar judicial standards, none of which
has distinguished itself in the Establishment Clause arena.4 In addition,
clergy was unconstitutional for Establishment Clause reasons); Westside Commu-
nity Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250-53 (1990) (holding that public high
school's refusal to allow religious club to meet in its facilities was unconstitutional);
Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989) (finding
creche displayed within county courthouse to be in violation of Establishment
Clause, while menorah displayed outside of courthouse but on government prop-
erty was not unconstitutional); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618-22 (1988)
(holding that act authorizing federal funding for nonprofit agencies offering ado-
lescent sexual relations and pregnancy counseling, some of which goes to institu-
tions with religious ties, did not violate Constitution); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397-98 (1985) (finding that district program providing classes to
nonpublic school students at public expense and in classrooms leased from non-
public schools violated Establishment Clause); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60-61
(1985) (holding that state statute which provided for one-minute period of silence
in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer violated First Amendment);
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (finding that Christmas display owned
by city and displayed in public park did not constitute violation of Establishment
Clause); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983)
(holding that school district's preferential inter-school mail system policy did not
violate First Amendment); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-77 (1981) (find-
ing public university's policy of excluding religious organizations from building or
grounds of university unconstitutional); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42-43
(1980) (finding state statute requiring posting of copy of Ten Commandments on
wall of each public school classroom violated Establishment Clause of First Amend-
ment); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 624-25 (1971) (finding state statute pro-
viding for salary supplement to be paid to underpaid nonpublic school teachers
not teaching religion courses unconstitutional); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (finding constitutional school district's policy of reimbursing
parents for public bus fares paid for transportation of children attending nonpub-
lic schools).
4. The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Leading Cases, 103 HARV. L. REv. 228 (1989)
[hereinafter Leading Cases]. The author criticizes each of the tests currently em-
ployed by the United States Supreme Court in its Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, writing that "[t] he widely divergent perspectives of the Justices on what the
establishment clause prohibits do not bode well for the development of a consis-
tent and predictable jurisprudence in the near future." Id. at 239.
The lack of direction provided by the Supreme Court in this area of constitu-
tional law is evident from the preponderance of conflicting decisions in the federal
appellate courts. Compare Chabad-Lubavitsch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1395-96
(11th Cir. 1993) (holding that state would not violate Establishment Clause by
permitting religious group to exhibit menorah in public plaza during Chanukah),
Americans United v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1553-54 (6th Cir. 1992)
(determining that privately funded menorah display erected in public forum did
not violate Establishment Clause), and Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 622 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that display of religious paintings in public park does not violate
Establishment Clause); with Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d
109, 112 (2d Cir. 1991) (determining that proposed display of menorah in city
park would violate Establishment Clause), ACLU v. Wilkinson, 895 F.2d 1098,
1106-07 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that structure resembling biblical-age stable on
State Capitol Building grounds did not amount to unconstitutional endorsement
of religion), Smith v. County of Albermarle, Va., 895 F.2d 953, 958-60 (4th Cir.
1990) (establishing that erection of nativity scene on front lawn of county office
[Vol. 41: p. 559
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been further complicated by the
public forum doctrine, which provides generally that while private religious
speech is constitutionally protected against state suppression, it is not
thereby accorded a guaranteed forum on all property owned by the state. 5
As a result of the confusion surrounding a Supreme Court standard for
adjudication of Establishment Clause issues, the right to use government
property for private expression has come to depend upon whether the
property has by law or tradition been given the status of a public forum.6
When private religious speech seeks a forum for expression on public
property, the Establishment Clause, the Free Speech and Exercise Clauses,
and the public forum doctrine collide, resulting in questions regarding
the constitutionality of government practices relating to private speech on
religious topics. 7 The failure of the United States Supreme Court to artic-
building violated Establishment Clause), Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d
1024, 1030-31 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding unattended, solitary display of large meno-
rah in public park adjacent to city hall unconstitutional), and McCreary v. Stone,
739 F.2d 716, 730 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that diplay of creche in public forum for
two weeks of holiday season would not violate Establishment Clause).
5. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. The Perry Court stated that "[t]he existence of a
right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon such
a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at is-
sue." Id. at 44 (emphasis added).
6. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund: Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985) (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45). In Perry, the Court defined three types of fora:
(1) the traditional public forum, (2) the public forum created by government
designation and (3) the nonpublic forum. Id. Perry defined traditional public fora as
those places which "by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to
assembly and debate." Peny, 460 U.S. at 45.
The Perry Court defined public forum created by governmental designation as an
area "created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups .... or for the
discussion of certain subjects." Id. at 46 n.7 (citations omitted). In addition, the
Court noted that the government is not required to indefinitely retain the open
character of such a facility. Id. at 46.
The Cornelius Court explained that not every instrumentality used for commu-
nication is a traditional public forum or a public forum by designation. Cornelius,
473 U.S. at 803. In addition, the Court concluded that "[tlhe government does
not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse." Id. at
802 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46). Rather, a public forum is created only by the
intentional opening of a nontraditional forum for public discourse. Id. "We will
not find that a public forum has been created in the face of clear evidence of a
contrary intent .... nor will we infer that the government intended to create a
public forum when the nature of the property is inconsistent with expressive activ-
ity." Id. at 803 (citation omitted).
7. See Daniel Parish, Comment, Private Religious Displays in Public Fora, 61 U.
CHI. L. REv. 253 (1994). Parish discusses the legal and philosophical quandary
presented by private religious displays in public fora. Id. at 253-54. Parish writes:
On the one hand, the Free Speech Clause generally prohibits content-
based restrictions on private expression in the public forum. Similarly,
the Free Exercise Clause specifically protects private religious expression.
On the other hand, the Establishment Clause requires that the govern-
ment not endorse one religion over another or religion over irreligion.
When the government appears to sponsor religion by allowing private
religious expression in a public forum, the doctrines collide.
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ulate a clear, workable and definitive standard for such situations has re-
sulted in lower court confusion, and consequently, a lack of consistency in
the law. 8 The subject of this Note, Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v.
Pinette,9 addresses some of this confusion and establishes a clear per se
rule for courts confronted with issues of private religious expression in
public foraY°
Part II of this Note discusses the history of Establishment Clause juris-
prudence preceding the plurality opinion in Capitol Square and examines
different actions taken by the Court when confronted with issues concern-
ing First Amendment interpretation.1 1 Part III sets forth the facts and
procedural history of Capitol Square.12 Part IV of this Note outlines the
plurality's reasoning in Capitol Square and its per se rule for private reli-
gious speech in public fora.13 Part V also examines the theoretical, his-
torical and practical flaws of the current Establishment Clause standards of
review and argues in favor of the plurality's per se rule as an effective and
much-needed remedy.14 Finally, Part V considers the ramifications of the
plurality's holding in Capitol Square, including the way in which the plural-
ity's decision will effect future litigation concerning the Free Speech, Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment, with respect
to private religious messages in public fora. 15
Id.
8. The Supreme Court has developed multiple standards over the last twenty-
five years for adjudication of Establishment Clause questions. See, e.g., Lee, 112 S.
Ct. at 2656-61 (using coercion standard to analyze Establishment Clause question);
Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248-53 (applying Lemon test); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 595-
97 (applying endorsement test outlined in Lynch); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-84 (out-
lining endorsement test for evaluating Establishment Clause violations); Lemon,
403 U.S. at 612-13 (establishing three-pronged test for determining whether "ex-
cessive entanglement" of religion and government constitutes violation of Estab-
lishment Clause); Everson, 330 U.S. at 18 (holding that government must espouse
policy of "neutralism" with regard to religion so as not to violate Establishment
Clause).
9. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
10. For a discussion of the per se rule outlined by the plurality in Capitol
Square, see infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the history of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see
infra notes 16-84 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the facts in Capitol Square, see infra notes 85-92 and
accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Capitol Square, see
infra notes 93-129 and accompanying text.
14. For an analysis of the plurality's holding in Capitol Square, see infra notes
130-49 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the impact of Capitol Square upon future Establishment
Clause adjudications, see infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 41: p. 559
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Establishment Clause Interpretation
Modem Establishment Clause jurisprudence was initiated in 1947
with the Supreme Court's decision in Everson v. Board of Education.1 6
Utilizing a historical analysis, the Court reasoned that the Establishment
Clause applied to the states, and that it mandated a government policy of
"neutralism" with regard to religion. 17 Arriving at this conclusion, the
Court adopted the now famous metaphoric language of Thomas Jefferson,
which reads: "[T]he clause against the establishment of religion by law
was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State."' 1 8
16. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In Everson, a taxpayer challenged a New Jersey statute
that authorized reimbursement to parents for money expended in the transporta-
tion of their children to school on public transportation. Id. at 3. A portion of this
money was reimbursed to parents whose children attended parochial schools. Id.
As a result, the taxpayer claimed that this practice violated both the Due Process
Clause and the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 5.
Everson alleged that the statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment because parents sent their children to parochial schools in
order to satisfy the parents' "personal desires," rather than the "public's interest in
the general education of all children." Id. at 6. The Court, however, dismissed this
argument, finding that the statute served a legitimate public need. Id. The Court
determined that "[t]he fact that a state law, passed to satisfy a public need, coin-
cides with the personal desires of the individuals most directly affected is certainly
an inadequate reason for us to say that a legislature has erroneously appraised the
public need." Id.
Everson also alleged that the statute was an unconstitutional establishment of
religion. Id. at 8. The Court disagreed, holding that it could not strike down a
state statute if it was within the state's constitutional power, even though it ap-
proached the verge of that power. Id. at 16 (citing Interstate Consol. St. Ry. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 88 (1907)). The Court concluded: "We cannot say the
First Amendment prohibits New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the
bus fares of parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which it
pays the fares of pupils attending public and other schools." Id. at 17.
17. Id. at 18. The Everson Court wrote that the "Amendment requires the
state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers and non-
believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no
more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." Id.
Applying this "neutrality standard," the Court determined that because the
State did not contribute money to religious schools and did not support them, its
legislation did "no more than provide a general program to help parents get their
children, regardless of their religion, safely and expediently to and from accred-
ited schools." Id. As such, the statue did not violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. Id.
18. Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (em-
phasis added)). Writing for the Court, Justice Black looked to James Madison and
Thomas Jefferson in an attempt to flesh out the meaning of the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 11-14. Justice Black wrote:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at
least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a per-
son to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him
to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be pun-
NOTE
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Following Everson, and premised upon its rationale, the Supreme
Court rendered a number of decisions involving Establishment Clause in-
terpretation.19 Yet it was not until 1971 and Lemon v. Kurtzman,20 that the
Court consolidated these decisions into a clear standard. 21 In Lemon, the
Court formulated a three-prong test for determining whether a chal-
lenged state action violated the Establishment Clause.2 2 In order for state
ished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for
church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly
or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Thomas Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a "wall of
separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted). The Court further asserted that this "wall must be
kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach." Id. at 18.
19. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 678-80 (1970) (upholding prop-
erty tax exemptions for religious organizations); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 247-49 (1968) (upholding statute requiring public school authorities to loan
books free of charge to private and parochial schools); Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-26 (1963) (invalidating laws requiring that school day
begin with reading of Lord's Prayer or selection from Bible); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 433 (1962) (declaring practice of beginning public school day with
prayer selected by State Board unconstitutional); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 451-53 (1961) (finding Sunday closing laws constitutional because they ac-
complished secular purpose); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952) (hold-
ing constitutional statute providing for release of public school pupils from school
attendance to attend religious classes); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948) (invokingJefferson's "wall of separation,"Justice Black
held that use of public school system to enable sectarian groups to give instruction
during regular school hours violates Establishment Clause).
20. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
21. See Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Comment, Is Lemon a Lemon? Crosscurrents in
Contemporary Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 ST. MARY's L.J. 129, 131-32 (1990)
(discussing three-pronged Lemon test). In Lemon, the Court held that an Act pro-
viding for a salary supplement to be paid to teachers in nonpublic schools, whose
salaries were less than those earned by teachers in public schools, violated the Es-
tablishment Clause of the First Amendment. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 608-09. The Court
reasoned that the cumulative impact of the relationship arising under the statute
involved an "excessive entanglement" of government and religion. Id.
The Lemon Court explained that this "excessive entanglement" arose because
the government would need continuing surveillance to ensure that the statutory
restrictions were obeyed, and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Id. at
619-22. In addition, the state would need to continually audit the financial records
of church-related schools in order to determine the proper amount of grants. Id.
at 621-22. The Court determined that these necessities created an intimate and
continuing relationship between church and state, resulting in a violation of the
First Amendment. Id.
22. Id. at 612-13. In outlining its standard of review for Establishment Clause
inquiries, the Lemon Court wrote that "[i] n the absence of precisely stated constitu-
tional prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to the three main evils
against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: 'spon-
sorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious ac-
tivity."' Id. at 612 (quoting Wal, 397 U.S. at 668).
564
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action to pass Establishment Clause scrutiny under Lemon, it must: (1)
have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster excessive governmental entangle-
ments with religion.23 Although conflict has developed regarding Lemon's
workability, the Supreme Court has consistently invoked some version of
Lemon in its Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 24
The Court proposed the first significant modification of the Lemon
analysis thirteen years later in Lynch v. Donnelly.25 Writing for the concur-
The Court noted that in order to determine whether or not an instance of
government entanglement with religion is excessive, "[the Court] must examine
the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the
aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government
and the religious authority." Id. at 615. The Lemon Court added that its prior
holdings do not call for total separation between church and state, as some rela-
tionship between government and religious organizations is inevitable. Id. at 614.
23. Id. at 612-13. The prongs of the Lemon test were gleaned from some of
the Court's prior cases. Id. at 612. The Court borrowed the second prong from
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968), and took the third prong from
Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
24. See, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S.
Ct. 2141, 2148 (1993) (establishing that School District property used to exhibit
film sponsored by church is not establishment of religion under Lemon); Westside
Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235 (1990) (determining that
logic of Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271-75 (1981), which applied Lemon test to
hold that "equal access policy" at state university did not violate Establishment
Clause, applied with equal force to Equal Access Act in Mergens); Allegheny County
v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592, 589-94 (1989) (holding that creche
displayed in county courthouse was impermissible governmental endorsement of
religion in violation of Lemon); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602 (1988) (de-
termining that act authorizing federal grants to public or nonprofit organizations
for services and research in area of premarital adolescent sexual relations did not
violate Lemon test); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 382-83, 397
(1985) (utilizing Lemon in concluding that school district program providing
classes to nonpublic school students at public expense, in classrooms leased from
nonpublic schools, constituted "excessive entanglement"); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 58-59 (1985) (utilizing Lemon in holding that one-minute period of silence
in all public schools for "meditation or voluntary prayer" violated First Amend-
ment); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (holding that statute requiring
posting of Ten Commandments on wall of each public school classroom had no
"secular legislative purpose," in violation Lemon).
25. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Applying a Lemon analysis, the Lynch Court deter-
mined that the inclusion of a cr~che in a holiday display, located in a park owned
by a nonprofit organization and located in the city's central shopping district, did
not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 685-86. The Court wrote that the nar-
row question presented involved whether there was a secular purpose for the display
of the cr~che. Id. at 681. The Court also added that this determination is all that
Lemon requires. Id. at 681 n.6.
Because the creche was sponsored by the city to celebrate the holiday recog-
nized both by Congress and by national tradition, and because the creche was
erected to depict the origins of the holiday, the Lynch Court found that the display
had a secular purpose. Id. at 680-85. "The Court has invalidated legislation or
governmental action on the ground that a secular purpose was lacking, but only
when it has concluded there was no question that the statute or activity was moti-
vated wholly by religious considerations." Id. at 680 (emphasis added). Thus, be-
7
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rence, Justice O'Connor suggested a reframing of the Establishment
Clause issue to question whether a state action conveys a message of "en-
dorsement" or disapproval of religion.2 6 Justice O'Connor further ex-
pounded upon this formulation a year later in Wallace v. Jafftee,27 writing
that an endorsement analysis "does not preclude government from acknowl-
edging religion or from taking religion into account in making law and
policy. [But i] t does preclude government from conveying or attempting
to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored
or preferred."28
Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test," as it has come to be known,
determines the existence of an Establishment Clause violation by measur-
ing the effects of a state action upon a reasonable observer within the com-
munity. 29 Justice O'Connor contends that this test is more useful than
cause the religious benefit of the display was incidenta4 and not its principle
purpose, the display was constitutional. Id. at 683.
26. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor wrote that it had
never been entirely clear how the three prongs of Lemon relate to the principles
enshrined in the Establishment Clause. Id. at 688-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor argued that focusing on institutional entanglement and endorse-
ment of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device. Id. at 689
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Such an approach, argued justice O'Connor, brings
the "purpose prong" and the "effects prong" of Lemon together into a single and
more workable standard. Id. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
27. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). In Wallace, the Court held that an Alabama statute
authorizing a one-minute period of silence in all public schools for "meditation or
voluntary prayer" resulted in an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 60-61. While the majority applied the factors of Lemon and deter-
mined that the statute's purpose was to endorse religion without any clear secular
motivation, Justice O'Connor reiterated the effectiveness of her endorsement test,
arguing that it was a more workable standard of review. Id. at 68-70 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
Justice O'Connor framed the question at issue as being not what the purpose of
the statute was, but rather, "whether an objective observer, acquainted with the
text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a
state endorsement" of religion. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
28. Id. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In addition,Justice O'Connor wrote
that if either of the two religion clauses were expanded to their logical extreme,
they would clash with one another. Id. at 82 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor noted that the Court had long dealt with this conflict by calling for
"government 'neutrality' toward religion." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). A no-
tion of complete neutrality, however, is difficult, if not impossible, to square with
the Free Exercise Clause, which sometimes exempts a religious observer from Es-
tablishment Clause concerns. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, Justice
O'Connor offered that "[t] he solution to the conflict between the Religion Clauses
lies not in 'neutrality,' but rather in identifying workable limits to the govern-
ment's license to promote the free exercise of religion." Id. at 83 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
29. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
noted that the meaning of a statement to its audience depends both upon the
intention of the speaker and upon the objective meaning of the statement. Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring). "Examination of both the subjective and the objective
components of the message communicated by a government action is therefore
8
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Lemon in achieving the underlying purposes of the First Amendment, be-
cause it gives analytic content to the purpose and effect of governmental
practices, while abandoning the confusing and misguided "entanglement"
inquiry of the Lemon analysis.30
Following Lynch and Wallace, the endorsement test ascended to the
forefront of Establishment Clause jurisprudence in Allegheny County v.
Greater Pittsburgh ACLU. 3 1 Five Justices adopted the endorsement test in
Allegheny County, stipulating that government must remain secular and not
appear to take a position on questions of religious belief.32 The Court
necessary to determine whether the action carries a forbidden meaning." Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice O'Connor explained that what is crucial is that a government practice
not have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or
disapproval of religion. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
added that each government practice must be adjudged in its unique circum-
stances, with respect to its specific context, in order to determine whether it consti-
tutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion. Id. at 694 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
30. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 68-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Wallace, Justice
O'Connor emphasized that her desire is not to abandon Lemon entirely. Id. at 68
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Rather, Justice O'Connor argued for a re-examina-
tion and a refinement of its prongs in order to make them more useful in inter-
preting First Amendment issues. Id. at 68-69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor wrote:
The endorsement test is useful because of the analytic content it gives to
the Lemon-mandated inquiry into legislative purpose and effect. In this
country, church and state must necessarily operate within the same com-
munity. Because of this coexistence, it is inevitable that the secular inter-
ests of government and the religious interests of various sects and their
adherents will frequently intersect, conflict, and combine. A statute that
ostensibly promotes a secular interest often has an incidental or even a
primary effect of helping or hindering a sectarian belief. Chaos would
ensue if every such statute were invalid under the Establishment Clause
.... The task for the Court is to sort out those statutes and government
practices whose purpose and effect go against the grain of religious lib-
erty protected by the First Amendment.
Id. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In addition, Justice O'Connor outlined in
Wallace that the relevant issue was whether "an objective observer, acquainted With
the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as
a state endorsement" of religion. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J, concurring). This con-
stitutes Justice O'Connor's "reasonable observer." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
31. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). Allegheny County marked the first time that a majority
of the Court explicitly relied on the endorsement test. Parish, supra note 7, at 261.
Yet, argues Parish, because of the logistical confusion created by Allegheny County's
multiple opinions, the endorsement test's ascendancy was not complete. Id. Par-
ish outlines three contenders for Establishment Clause supremacy in light of the
confusion created by Allegheny County: (1) the Lemon prongs, (2) the endorsement
test and (3) the coercion standard. Id.
32. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 600-01. In Allegheny County, the Court wrote
that Justice O'Connor's endorsement test provided a sound analytical framework
for evaluating governmental use of religious symbols. Id. at 595. The Court under-
stood the endorsement test as invalidating governmental endorsement of religion
because it "'sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full mem-
bers of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that
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determined that because the Establishment Clause limits not only the reli-
gious content of the government's own communications, but also the gov-
ernment's support and promotion of religious communications by private
religious organizations, an endorsement analysis was best suited to Estab-
lishment Clause interpretation.33
After Allegheny County, however, it took only three years for the
Supreme Court to introduce yet another standard into its Establishment
Clause soup, in Lee v. Weisman.3 4 Writing for the majority in Lee, Justice
Kennedy applied a "coercion analysis" to the question of whether invoca-
tion and benediction prayers given by clergymen at graduation ceremo-
nies were constitutional.3 5 Kennedy stated that "[i]t is beyond dispute
that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise, or other-
wise act in a way which 'establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or
tends to do So.' '36 The Kennedy majority held that the school district's
supervision and control of the graduation ceremony placed peer and pub-
lic pressure on attending students to adhere to, or at least to appear to
adhere to (as evidenced by their silence), the religious view being es-
they are insiders, favored members of the political community."' Id. (emphasis
added) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
Second, the Allegheny County Court stated that the endorsement test "articu-
lates a method for determining whether the government's use of a religious object
has the effect of endorsing religion." Id. This determination, noted the Court, de-
pends upon "'what viewers of the object may fairly understand to be the purpose of
the display."' Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
33. Id. at 600-01. The Allegheny County Court reasoned that the very concept
of "endorsement" conveys the sense of promoting someone else's message. Id. The
Court noted that a "secular state" is not the same as an atheistic or antireligious
state. Id. at 610. The Constitution therefore prohibits the "endorsement" of reli-
gion by government and not the practice of religion by individuals. Id. Thus, the
Allegheny County Court concluded that the standard of review in such cases should
be whether the questioned practice "demonstrates the government's support, pro-
motion, or 'endorsement' of the particular creed of a particular sect." Id. at 608.
34. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). One commentator writes that although Lee did
not directly address the issue of religious displays, its coercion test is evidence of
the continuing drift of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Parish, supra note 7,
at 261 n.58.
35. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2656-61. In Lee, Justice Kennedy stated that the situation
did not warrant the use of Lemon as an analytical framework. Id. at 2655. Justice
Kennedy wrote:
The government involvement with religious activity in this case is perva-
sive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious
exercise in a public school. Conducting this formal religious observance
conflicts with settled rules pertaining to prayer exercises for students, and
that suffices to determine the question before us.
Id.
36. Id. (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678). Justice Kennedy concluded that the
state's involvement in school prayer violated these central principles because an
overt religious exercise in a secondary school environment creates coercive pres-
sures, in which the students have no real alternative allowing them to avoid the fact
or appearance of participation. Id. at 2655-56.
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poused.3 7 This, the Court concluded, constituted oppressive state coer-
cion in violation of the Establishment Clause.3 8
Currently, courts may select and utilize any of the three preceding
Establishment Clause standards-the Lemon rationale, the endorsement
test or the coercion analysis-developed by the Supreme Court over the
last twenty-five years.3 9 The natural result of such undefined parameters,
however, has been a lack of judicial consistency in Establishment Clause
interpretation and application. 40
B. Religious Displays in Public Fora
In addition to selecting a standard for Establishment Clause review of
a private religious message on property owned by the state, a court must
also incorporate an examination of the public forum doctrine41 into its Estab-
lishment Clause analysis.42 Utilizing Lemon, the Supreme Court under-
took such an examination in 1981, in Widmar v. Vincent.43 In Widmar, the
37. Id. at 2658. The Lee Court noted that merely standing or remaining silent
in our culture can signify adherence to, or respect for, the views of others. Id. The
Court concluded from this supposition that in effect, the state was requiring school
participation in a religious exercise. Id. at 2659. Thus, students were induced by
the state to conform to a religious activity in violation of the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 2661.
38. Id. at 2656-58. In Lee, Justice Kennedy pointed out that coercion existed
because the state's role did not end with its decision to include a prayer and clergy-
men in the ceremony. Id. at 2656. Rather, because the school principal provided
the Rabbi with a copy of the District Guidelines (outlining what would be accepta-
ble for the occasion), and because the principal advised the Rabbi that the prayers
should be nonsectarian, the Court determined that the principal, in effect, "con-
trolled the content of the prayer." Id. As a result, the Court stated that the princi-
pal's efforts to "monitor" the prayer will be perceived by the students as inducing a
participation they might otherwise reject. Id. at 2657.
Thus, the Lee Court concluded that this perceived inducement, coupled with
the public and peer pressure created at the ceremony, comprised an unconsitu-
tional policy of indoctrination and coercion. Id. at 2658.
39. The various Establishment Clause standards include the three-prong test
outlined in LemonJustice O'Connor's endorsement test andJustice Kennedy's "co-
ercion" or "proselytization" test. For a discussion of these standards, see infra notes
133-39 and accompanying text.
40. For a discussion of United States Supreme Court cases illustrating this
inconsistency, see supra note 3. For a discussion of federal district court cases illus-
trating this inconsistency, see supra note 4 and infra notes 68-84 and accompanying
text.
41. For a definition and further discussion of the public forum doctrine, see
supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 624-25 (7th Cir. 1992) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring) ("It is strange that a government can violate the Establishment Clause
by tolerating free speech .... [But a]t some point ... a private religious group may
so dominate a public forum that a formal policy of equal access degenerates into
endorsement."). One commentator notes that it is for this reason that an analysis
of the constitutional limits on private religious displays requires consideration of
the Court's public forum doctrine. Parish, supra note 7, at 263-64.
43. 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Widmar, a registered student religious group that
had previously received permission to conduct its meetings in university facilities
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Court established that because a public university had an "open forum"
for student activities of all types, regulation of student speech had to be
"content neutral."44 The Court determined that a content-based exclu-
sion from a public forum can only be justified by a showing that (1) the
regulation was necessary to serve a compelling state interest4O and (2) that it
was narrowly drawn to achieve that end.4 6 Finding no compelling state in-
was informed that it could no longer do so because of a university regulation
prohibiting the use of university buildings or grounds for purposes of religious
worship or teaching. Id. at 265. Members of the group filed suit, alleging that the
regulation violated their rights to free exercise of religion and freedom of speech
under the First Amendment. Id. at 266.
The Court noted that the university policy would be valid and would not of-
fend the Establishment Clause, if inclusion of the religious group would survive
Lemon's three-pronged test. Id. at 271. The university argued that allowing reli-
gious groups to share the limited public forum would have the primary effect of
advancing religion, thus violating the third prong of Lemon. Id. at 272. The
Widmar Court disagreed, finding that all three prongs of the test were satisfied
because a religious organization's enjoyment of merely "incidental" benefits does
not violate the third prong's prohibition against the primary advancement of reli-
gion. Id. at 273 (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. of Religious Liberty v. Nyguist,
413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973)). The Court noted that the forum at the university is
available to a broad class of both nonreligious and religious groups (totalling in
excess of 100), such that the university cannot be seen as conferring any "imprima-
tur" of state approval on any one group, religious or otherwise. Id. at 274.
44. Id. at 269. The Widmar Court found that through its policy of accommo-
dating various student groups and their meetings, the university created a forum
"generally open for use by student groups." Id. at 267. Further, the Court found
that the Constitution "forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum
generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create the forum in the
first place." Id. at 267-68 (citing Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 & n.8 (1976) (holding that where state has
opened forum for direct citizen involvement, exclusions bear heavy burden of
justification)).
45. Id. at 270. While a precise definition of a "compelling state interest"
would be difficult, if not impossible to arrive at, courts have found certain criteria
sufficient to satisfy the standard. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981) (noting that state's interest in
protecting "safety and convenience" of persons using public forum is valid govern-
mental objective); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 465 (1980) (holding that state's
interest in maintaining residential privacy did not justify statute prohibiting resi-
dential picketing).
In Heffron, the Court indicated that the consideration of a forum's special
attributes-the public forum doctrine-is relevant to the constitutionality of a reg-
ulation because "the significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in
light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved."
Heffron, 452 U.S. at 650-51. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
302-03 (1974) (stating that nature of forum and conflicting interests involved are
important factors in determining First Amendment protection); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972) ("The crucial question is whether the manner
of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place
at a particular time."). For a discussion of the public forum doctrine, see supra
notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
46. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270. See also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educa-
tors' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 45 (1983) (holding that content of public forum can only be
regulated if restriction is necessary and is narrowly drawn to serve compelling state
[Vol. 41: p. 559
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terest, the Widmar Court held that the university's exclusion of the reli-
gious club was "content-based discrimination," in violation of the First
Amendment.47
Following Widmar, the Court first applied the Lemon test to a public
religious display in Lynch v. Donnelly.48 In Lynch, the Court determined
that a creche, sponsored by the city to celebrate the holiday season and to
depict the holiday's origins, did not violate the Establishment Clause be-
cause it served a "legitimate secular purpose."49 In other words, because
the creche had a secular purpose and was displayed in a park that was a
public forum, a regulation prohibiting the display would not serve a com-
pelling state interest, and would therefore be unconstitutional.50
The Court used a similar analysis in Allegheny County, where it applied
Justice O'Connor's endorsement test to an Establishment Clause question
interest). Because the university could not demonstrate that allowing the religious
group to use their facilities would violate the Establishment Clause (which would
constitute a "compelling interest"), the Court found that there was no compelling
interest to justify the content-based exclusion. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 271-77.
47. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. The Court noted that religious forms of speech
and association are protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 269. Therefore, the
Widmar Court concluded that the university had discriminated against student
groups based on their desire to use a generally open forum for religious worship
and discussion, in violation of the First Amendment. Id.
48. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). In Lynch, the Court was faced with the issue of
whether a crtche included in a city sponsored Christmas display, which was situ-
ated in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the city's central
shopping district, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id.
at 671. Applying the factors of Lemon and finding that the city had a "secular pur-
pose" for including the creche in its display, the Court held that the display did not
impermissably advance religion or create an excessive entanglement between reli-
gion and government. Id. at 680-81, 685 & n.6.
49. Id. at 681. In Lynch, the majority noted that "[i]t has never been thought
either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation [between
church and state]." Id. at 673 (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973)). "Nor does the Constitution require
complete separation of church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommoda-
tion, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility towards any." Id.
See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1952) (stating that government
must be neutral in addressing competition between sects); Illinois ex rel. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948) (noting that state hostility towards
religious faiths offends First Amendment freedom of religion).
50. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681-85. The Lynch Court arrived at this conclusion
through its application of Widmar. Id. at 683. In this regard, the Court wrote:
We can assume, arguendo, that the display advances religion in a sense;
but our precedents plainly contemplate that on occasion some advance-
ment of religion will result from governmental action. The Court has
made it abundantly clear, however, that "not every law that confers an
'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon [religion] is, for that rea-
son alone, constitutionally invalid."
Id. (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 771). Because the benefit to religion conferred by
the display was indirect, as the display had a secular purpose, a compelling state
interest was implicated. Id. Thus, the Lynch Court concluded that the display met
the constitutional requirements of Widmar. Id.
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regarding two religious displays in two differing types of fora.51 In Alle-
gheny County, the Court held that a crrche placed on the Grand Staircase
inside of the Allegheny County Courthouse was unconstitutional, while a
menorah placed outside of the City-County Building and next to a Christ-
mas tree was constitutional.5 2
In distinguishing its decision regarding the placement of the cr6che,
from its holding in Lynch, the Allegheny County Court determined that the
Grand Staircase could not be characterized as a truly public forum in the
way that the park had been in Lynch.5 3 The Allegheny County Court also
established that the state had a compelling interest in restricting the
message of the Allegheny County Courthouse display, because unlike
Lynch, nothing in the context of the display mitigated its religious
message.5 4 In this way, the Allegheny County Court differentiated between
the menorah, which stood alongside a Christmas tree, conveying a secular
51. Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595-97
(1989). The fora in question in Allegheny County were (1) the county courthouse,
owned by Allegheny County and operating as its seat of government and (2) the
City-County Building, which is a block away from the courthouse and jointly owned
by the city of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County. Id. at 579, 581.
Since 1981, the Holy Name Society, a Roman Catholic group, had displayed a
creche on the Grand Staircase of the County Courthouse during the Christmas
season. Id. at 579-80. The Grand Staircase was located inside of the courthouse
and at its entrance. Id.
For a number of years the city had sponsored a large Christmas tree during
the holiday season, which was placed under the middle arch of the City-County
building. Id. at 581. In recent years, however, the city had expanded the display
outside of the City-County building to include representations of Chanukah, for
the eight-day Jewish holiday. Id. at 582. Accordingly, the city placed a menorah
next to the Christmas tree. Id. at 587.
52. Id. at 579. In Allegheny County, the Court noted that "the government's use
of religious symbolism is unconstitutional if it has the effect of endorsing religious
beliefs, and the effect of the government's use of religious symbolism depends
upon its context." Id. at 597 (emphasis added). Thus, the Allegheny County Court
distinguished between the creche and the menorah on the basis of the context in
which they were presented. Id.
53. Id. at 598. The Allegheny County Court noted that "[t] here is no doubt...
that the creche itself is capable of communicating a religious message." Id. Yet,
the Court stated that the display's context can mitigate this capability. Id. Address-
ing the context of the creche the Allegheny County Court distinguished its situation
from that in Lynch, pointing out that the fora, or the context in which the displays
were presented, differed in the two cases. Id. In Lynch, the creche was displayed
outside, among various other figures, and in an open public park owned by a non-
profit organization in the town's central shopping district. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
In contrast, the creche in Allegheny County was displayed inside a government-
owned building, where it stood by itself at the building's entrance. Allegheny
County, 492 U.S. at 579.
54. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 598-602. In Lynch, the creche in question was
located in a Christmas display containing, among many things, a Santa Claus
house, a Christmas tree and a banner which read "SEASONS GREETINGS."
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. In Allegheny County, the creche was placed alone with an
angel bearing a banner which read: "Gloria in Excelsis Deol" Allegheny County, 492
U.S. at 580. The Court concluded that the messages conveyed by the two displays
were distinctively different. Id. at 598.
[Vol. 41: p. 559
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holiday message outside in an open public forum, and the crrche, which
stood alone inside the courthouse without a discernible secular purpose,
thereby giving the impression that the county supported and promoted
religion. 55
In 1990, the Supreme Court decided Westside Community Board of Edu-
cation v. Mergens,56 which returned to the Court the question of whether
the Establishment Clause permits public schools to sanction religious or-
ganizations. 57 Extending the logic of Widmar and its application of Lemon,
the Mergens Court reaffirmed its holding that denial of equal access to lim-
ited public fora is unconstitutional. 58 The Court noted that "there is a
crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which
the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion,
which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."59 Applying
this rationale, the Court concluded that because the school's policy of
equal access did not have the effect of "advancing religion," and was there-
55. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 598-602. The Court concluded that although
the government may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, it may not
observe it as a Christian holy day by suggesting that people celebrate the birth of
Jesus Christ. Id. at 601. Applying the endorsement test, the Allegheny Court arrived
at the conclusion that the creche, standing alone, would convey this type of uncon-
stitutional message. Id. at 601-02.
56. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
57. Id. at 235-37. In Mergens, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutional-
ity of a public school policy prohibiting the formation of religious clubs. Id. at 231-
53. Westside High School, a public secondary school, permitted students to volun-
tarily join a number of recognized groups and clubs, all of which met after school
hours on school premises. Id. at 231. In denying the religious club recognition,
the school cited Establishment Clause concerns. Id. at 233.
58. Id. at 247-53. In Mergens, the Court held that the school board's denial of
Mergen's request for permission to form a Christian club was an unconstitutional
violation of the Equal Access Act. Id. The Equal Access Act provided generally
that:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Fed-
eral financial assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny
equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students
who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open forum on the
basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the
speech at such meetings.
Id. at 235.
The Mergens Court concluded that because the school maintained a "limited
open forum," allowing various noncurriculum oriented groups to meet on school
property, it was prohibited from discriminating based on the content of student
speech. Id. at 247.
59. Id. at 250. Applying Lemon, the Mergens Court determined that an "equal
access policy" (such as the Act provided) did not violate the Establishment Clause.
Id. at 248. First, the Court concluded that "'an open-forum policy, including non-
discrimination against religious speech, would have a secular purpose, and would
in fact avoid entanglement with religion."' Id. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 271-72 (1981)). Second, the Court noted that such a forum conveys a
message of neutrality, rather than endorsement. Id. at 250. Third, the Court
stated that the broad spectrum of groups permitted in such a forum was an impor-
tant index of secular effect. Id. at 252.
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fore not in violation of the Establishment Clause, the state had no consti-
tutionally justifiable reason to restrict the speech in question. 60
The Supreme Court's position in Mergens was reiterated most recently
by the Court in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Distric 61
where it held that denying church access to school premises violated the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. 62 In Lamb's Chapel, the
Court noted that once a limited public forum is opened, exclusions from
such a forum must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.63 Thus, because
religious exclusion in a public forum is not viewpoint neutral, and there-
fore not reasonable, the Court concluded in Lamb's Chapel that such poli-
cies are unconstitutional.64
Widmar, Mergens and Lamb's Chapel each demonstrate that religious
messages have protected free speech rights in both limited and open pub-
60. Id. at 249-53. The Mergens Court rejected the school board's argument
that the Act had the primary effect of advancing religion. Id. at 249. Responding
to the board, the Court wrote that "[b]ecause the Act on its face grants equal
access to both secular and religious speech, we think it clear that the Act's purpose
was not to 'endorse or disapprove of religion."' Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 56 (1985)). In addition, the Court noted that the Act expressly limited
participation by school officials at meetings of student religious groups, thereby
precluding excessive entanglement concerns. Id. at 251.
Moreover, the Mergens Court stated that "[t]he proposition that schools do
not endorse everything they fail to censor, is not complicated." Id. at 250. The
Court concluded that secondary school children are likely to understand that a
school does not endorse or support speech that it merely permits on a nondiscrim-
inatory basis. Id.
61. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
62. Id. at 2149. In Lamb's Chapel an evangelical church applied to the school
district for permission to use school facilities after school hours in order to show a
six-part film series discussing the undermining influences of the media, which the
film argued, could only be counterbalanced by a return to traditional Christian
values. Id. at 2144.
The school district refused, claiming that because the film was "church re-
lated," New York Education Law did not permit it to allow the group access to
public property. Id. at 2145.
63. Id. at 2147 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund & Educ. Fund,
473 U.S. 788 (1985)). The Cornelius Court explained that:
Although a speaker may be excluded from a nonpublic forum if he
wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the fo-
rum ... or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose special
benefit the forum was created . . . the government violates the First
Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the
point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806 (citations omitted).
64. See Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147 (noting that government cannot deny
access to speaker based solely on content). The Lamb's Chapel Court determined
that the film was denied access solely because it dealt with its subject from a reli-
gious viewpoint. Id. This, the Court concluded, amounted to a constitutional vio-
lation. Id. Analogizing its conclusion to that of Widmar, the Lamb's Chapel Court
stated that "[w] e have no more trouble than did the Widmar Court in disposing of
the claimed defense on the ground that the posited fears of an Establishment
Clause violation are unfounded." Id. at 2148.
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lic fora. 65 Yet, as evidenced by Lynch and Allegheny County, and as a result
of the confusing multiplicity of standards applied to this issue, some courts
have concluded that free speech concerns and the public forum doctrine
must surrender to Establishment Clause supremacy.6 6 This disparity has
divided the lower federal courts.
6 7
C. Disarray in the Federal Courts
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fourth, Sixth
and Eleventh Circuits are illustrative of the federal court divergence in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 68 The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits
have upheld the constitutionality of private religious displays in public
fora, while the Second and Fourth Circuits have found that such expres-
sion violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
69
65. See Parish, supra note 7, at 265-67 (outlining history of restrictions on reli-
gious speech in public fora). Widmar, Mergens and Lamb's Chapel each stand for the
proposition that once a limited or open public forum is established, the speech
expressed in the forum may only be restricted if the restriction is reasonable (i.e.,
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to achieve that
end) and viewpoint neutral. Id. Thus, the public forum doctrine established by
this line of cases has ensured that religious expression has a constitutionally pro-
tected right to certain public areas. Id.
66. Id. In contrast to the Supreme Court's use of the public forum doctrine,
Lynch's and Allegheny's retention of the Lemon test has permitted the Court to assert
the Establishment Clause as a bar to certain forms of religious expression in public
areas. See, e.g., Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City of Burlington, 936 F.2d 109, 111-12
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding that menorah in public park violated Establishment
Clause); Smith v. County of Albermarle, Va., 895 F.2d 953, 956 (4th Cir. 1990)
(determining that nativity scene on front lawn of county office building violated
Establishment Clause); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024, 1028, 1030 (2d
Cir. 1989) (finding that permit to place menorah in City Hall violated Establish-
ment Clause).
67. For a discussion of Federal Appellate Court cases demonstrating this dis-
parity, see supra note 4 and infra notes 68-83 and accompanying text.
68. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have also weighed in on the Establish-
ment Clause issue. See, e.g., Kreisner v. City of S.D., 1 F.3d 775, 776 (9th Cir. 1993)
(determining that life-size statues depicting life of Christ, displayed in municipal
amphitheater, did not raise Establishment Clause concerns), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
690 (1994); Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611, 622 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that religious
paintings displayed in public city park did not violate Establishment Clause).
69. Compare Chabad-Lubavitch ofGa. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1395-96 (11th Cir.
1993) (holding that state would not violate Establishment Clause by permitting
religious group to exhibit menorah on public plaza during Chanukah), Americans
United v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1553 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding that
privately funded menorah display in public forum during Chanukah did not vio-
late Establishment Clause), Small; 964 F.2d at 622 (concluding that paintings dis-
playing religious messages in public park complied with Establishment Clause),
and American Civil Liberties Union v. Wilkinson, 895 F.2d 1098, 1106 (6th Cir.
1990) (determining that symbol of Christianity erected on grounds of state capitol
with disclaimer attached did not violate Establishment Clause); with Chabad-
Lubavitch of Vt., 936 F.2d at 112 (holding that menorah in public park violated
Establishment Clause), Smith, 895 F.2d at 956 (finding that nativity scene on front
lawn of county office building violated First Amendment), and Kaplan, 891 F.2d at
19961 NOTE
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In Americans United v. City of Grand Rapids for example, 70 the Sixth
Circuit determined that a privately funded menorah placed in a central
public plaza was constitutional.7 1 Similarly, in Chabad-Lubavitch of Georgia
v. Miller,72 the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the display of a privately
sponsored menorah in the rotunda of the state capitol did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 73 Both decisions are illustrative of the Sixth and
Eleventh Circuit's adherence to the principle that once a state opens a
public forum, it may exclude private religious speech within the forum
only when the exclusion survives a high standard of scrutiny.74
1024 (establishing that permit to place menorah in City Hall violated Establish-
ment Clause).
70. 980 F.2d 1538 (6th Cir. 1992).
71. Id. at 1553. The Americans United court reasoned that a privately funded
menorah erected during Chanukah, in a traditional public forum (a plaza in the
center of Grand Rapids, Michigan which was bordered by the county building, city
hall, the federal building, the police department, the State of Michigan building
and the courthouse) did not violate the Establishment Clause because "truly private
religious expression in a truly public forum cannot be seen as endorsement [of
religion] by a reasonable observer." Id.
Citing Widmar and Mergens for justification of its rationale, the Americans
United court analogized its case to Doe v. Small, in which the Seventh Circuit held
that a governmental policy of prohibiting the display of religious paintings in a
public park violated the Constitution. Id. at 1551-52 (citing Smal 964 F.2d at 611).
The Small court reasoned that:
Since the State of Missouri's desire [in Widmar] to achieve greater separa-
tion of church and state than provided for under the Establishment
Clause was an insufficient interest to justify a content-based exclusion of
religious speech in the limited public forum of a state university, we fail
to comprehend how the Establishment Clause could constitute a suffi-
ciently compelling state interest to justify a content-based exclusion of
private religious speech in a quintessential public forum.
Id. at 1552 (citing Smal4 964 F.2d at 618-19).
The Americans United court noted that the Supreme Court's recent decisions
to uphold equal access policies for religious speech in schools strongly indicated
that courts should uphold an equal access policy in traditional public fora (such as
parks) for all citizens, including those who wish to convey a religious message. Id.
at 1548.
72. 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993).
73. Id. at 1395-96. Having determined that the state's exclusion of the meno-
rah was based solely upon the religious content of its speech, the Miller court held
that this content-based exclusion of a display in a public forum violated the Consti-
tution. Id. Utilizing both the Lemon analysis and the endorsement test, the court
found no compelling state interest to justify exclusion of the menorah. Id. There-
fore, the court found no Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 1387-88.
The Miller court wrote: "That a public forum may be close to city hall cannot
matter; any forum open to secular speech must be open to religious speech." Id. at
1393. The court also stated that "[any perceived endorsement of religion in a
true public forum is simply misperception; the Establishment Clause is not, in fact,
violated." Id. at 1394.
74. In Americans United, the court indicated that an "equal access policy," such
as a public forum, "weighs very heavily in determining whether an endorsement of
religion has occurred." Americans United, 980 F.2d at 1548. Similarly, the Miller
court stated that "[o]nce the state decides to designate a public forum . . . the
monkey is on the state's back." Miller, 5 F.3d at 1394.
576
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In marked contrast to the holdings of these courts, the Fourth Circuit
reasoned in Smith v. County of Albermarle, Virginia75 that the erection of a
nativity scene by a private organization on the front lawn of a county office
building was unconstitutional.7 6 A similar rationale has also been adopted
by the Second Circuit, where the Court has twice found unattended pri-
vate religious displays in public fora to be unconstitutional. 77 In Kaplan v.
City of Burlington,78 the Second Circuit held that a menorah displayed in a
public park adjacent to City Hall violated the Establishment Clause. 79
Two years later in Chabad-Lubavitch of Vermont v. City of Burlington,8 0 the
Second Circuit reiterated its rationale in Kaplan, and affirmed the denial
of a permit to display a menorah in a city park on the grounds that it too
would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.8 1 Thus,
75. 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990).
76. Id. The Smith court held that the government had a compelling state in-
terest in removing the suggestion of governmental endorsement of religion, by
prohibiting the erection of a nativity scene on the front lawn of the county office
building. Id. at 959. Although the lawn was a public forum, the court, citing Alle-
gheny County and Lynch, reasoned that because the creche had no secular content,
it violated the Establishment Clause. Id.
In this regard, the Smith court wrote that "whether the lawn is or is not a
public forum is not dispositive. The critical gauge of any such content-related
speech restriction is whether the overall content and nature of the restricted dis-
play conveys the impermissible message of governmental endorsement of reli-
gion." Id. at 958 (referring to Judge Michael's comments in Allegheny County)
(footnote omitted).
77. Like the Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit has adopted the rationale of
Allegheny County, including its emphasis upon the physical context of the display in
question. In this regard, the Second Circuit, like the Fourth Circuit, has employed
an endorsement test analysis. See, e.g., Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City of Burling-
ton, 936 F.2d 109, 111-12 (2d Cir. 1991) (looking at entire display to determine
whether it would convey secular religious message); Kaplan v. City of Burlington,
891 F.2d 1024, 1026-27 (2d Cir. 1989) (evaluating physical setting and mitigating
circumstances of unattended menorah in public park adjacent to seat of
government).
Most recently, the Second Circuit employed its endorsement test analysis in
Creatore v. Town of Trumbull, where it held that a private individual could not erect
a creche on a town green. 68 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1995). The Creatore court refused to
adopt the per se rule articulated by the plurality in Capitol Square, opting instead,
for the endorsement test utilized in Allegheny County and articulated by Justices
O'Connor and Souter in Capitol Square. Id.
78. 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989).
79. Id. The Kaplan court likened the display of a menorah in its case to the
display of a creche in Allegheny County. Id. at 1029-30. The court concluded that,
given the display's location in a park closely associated with government, "no
viewer could reasonably think that [the display] occupies this location without the
support and approval of the government." Id. at 1030 (citing Allegheny County v.
Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)). In short, the Kaplan court indi-
cated "that if the unattended, solitary display of a crtche in Allegheny[County] was
impermissible on the facts of that case, the unattended, solitary display of the me-
norah here must also be barred." Id.
80. 936 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991).
81. Id. at 111-12. The Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. court held that given the park's
close association with the seat of government, display of a menorah in the park
19
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the Establishment Clause analysis adopted by the Fourth and Second Cir-
cuits relies upon Allegheny County's premise that in order for a religious
message to be constitutional on government property, it must have either
a legitimate secular purpose or some significant secular element to miti-
gate its religious message.8 2
The Supreme Court's failure to articulate a workable and definitive
standard has left federal courts with little guidance on the constitutionality
of private religious expression in public fora.8 3 Justice Scalia's per se rule
for private religious speech in public fora, however, alters this course, and
delivers courts from this troublesome constitutional ambiguity.
84
III. FAcrs
The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking an injunction requiring Capitol
Square Review and Advisory Board (the "Board") to issue a permit for the
erection of a "Latin Cross" 85 in Capitol Square, a plaza located adjacent to
the state capitol.8 6 In its complaint, the KKK alleged that their permit
would violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 111 (citing Kaplan, 891 F.2d at
1024).
82. In Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt., the court recognized that like the creche in
Allegheny County, the religious message of its menorah was not mitigated by addi-
tional messages, as none were part of the same display. See id. at 112.
Similarly, the Kaplan court noted that the existence of a public forum is only
one factor to be taken into account when determining whether the context of the
display constitutes endorsement; the display's message must also be considered.
See Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1029 (asserting that message conveyed to viewer of display
must be taken into account when determining its constitutionality).
83. Courts which have upheld free speech arid expression rights over Estab-
lishment Clause concerns include: Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383
(11th Cir. 1993); Americans United v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538 (6th
Cir. 1992); Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992); American Civil Liberties
Union v. Wilkinson, 895 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1990).
Courts which have determined that the Establishment Clause outweighs pub-
lic forum consideration include: Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt., 936 F.2d at 109; Smith v.
County of Albermarle, Va., 895 F.2d 953 (4th Cir. 1990); Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1024.
84. For a discussion of the per se rule outlined by Justice Scalia for private
religious speech in public fora, see infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
85. "Latin Cross" is the proper term for any cross whose base stem exceeds
the length of its other three arms. See American Civil Liberties Union v. City of St.
Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 271 (7th Cir.) (defining Latin Cross as principal symbol of
Christianity), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961 (1986).
86. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
Capitol Square is a ten acre state-owned plaza surrounding the Statehouse in Co-
lumbus, Ohio. Id. at 2444. The Square has been used for over a century as a
location for public speeches, gatherings and festivals. Id. These events have cele-
brated and advocated a variety of secular and religious causes. Id.
Ohio law mandates that Capitol Square be used as a forum for discussion of
public questions and activities. Id. Additionally, Ohio law gives the Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Board responsibility for regulating public access to the
Square. Id. (citing OHIo ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 128-4-02(A) (1994)). To use the
Square, a group need only fill out an official application form and meet several
[Vol. 41: p. 559
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss2/5
1996] NOTE 579
request had been denied in violation of their First Amendment right to
free speech.8 7
After denying their application, the Board notified the KKK that its
decision had been "made upon the advice of counsel, in a good faith at-
tempt to comply with the Ohio and United States's Constitutions, as they
have been interpreted in relevant decisions by the Federal and State
Courts."88 Specifically, the Board defended its action on the ground that
the display would violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.89
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
disagreed with the Board's decision, granted the injunction sought by the
KKK and ordered the Board to issue the requisite permit.90 Based upon
its finding that Capitol Square was a "traditional public forum" open to all,
without a policy against freestanding displays, the court held that the
KKK's cross was private expression entitled to the full protection of the
First Amendment.9 1 On appeal by the Board, the United States Court of
criteria pertaining to safety, sanitation and noninterference with other uses of the
Square. Id. The proposed use must also be neutral as to the speech content of the
proposed event. Id.
87. Id. at 2445. The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) filed their application on November
29, 1993, and it was denied by the Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board
("Board") on the third of December. Id. During that same week, the Board had
granted permits to display other various unattended holiday displays, including a
Christmas tree and a menorah. Id. at 2444.
It had been the Board's policy to allow a broad range of speakers and other
gatherings of people to conduct events on the Capitol Square, including homosex-
ual rights organizations, the KKK and the United Way. Id. The Board had also
permitted a variety of unattended displays on Capitol Square, including a State-
sponsored lighted tree during the Christmas season, a privately-sponsored meno-
rah during Chanukah, a display showing the progress of a United Way fundraising
campaign, and booths and exhibits during the arts festival. Id.
88. Id. at 2445.
89. Id. After the Board had denied their permit, the KKK sought administra-
tive relief from the Board's decision, but were unsuccessful. Id. A hearing exam-
iner then conducted an administrative appeal, during which evidence was taken,
and arguments were heard from both sides. See Brief for Petitioner, Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd., 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995) (No. 94-780), available in
1995 WL 89301, at *5. The examiner held that "whereas holiday seasonal symbols
have by virtue of that association taken on 'cultural significance extending well
beyond the religious sphere,' the Latin Cross 'is generally regarded as having a
purely sectarian purpose (i.e., to advance or endorse the Christian religion)."' Id.
(quoting Respondent's Administrative Appeal at A34-A35). The examiner con-
cluded that for this reason, the display of the Latin Cross, unlike the display of the
Christmas tree or the menorah, would violate the Establishment Clause. Id.
90. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2445. After the district court ordered the in-
junction and the Board's application for an emergency injunction was denied, the
Board permitted the KKK to erect its display on December 22. Brief for Petitioner,
1995 WL 89301, at *7. The cross was subsequently vandalized. Id. That same day,
the Board granted permits to several religious groups that planned to display
crosses in protest of the KKK's latin cross. Id.
91. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2445. Granting the injunction, the district
court concluded that the State of Ohio was in no way associating itself with the
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Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court decision, and the
Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari. 92
IV. ANALYsis: CAPITOL SQUARE REVIEW AND AD VISORY BOARD V. PrETTE
A. Narrative Analysis
In Capitol Square, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a
private, unattended display of a religious symbol in a public forum located
next to a seat of government, violated the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment.93 In reaching its holding that religious expression can-
not violate the Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2)
occurs in a traditional public forum, a plurality of the Court reasoned that
the display of a Latin Cross in Capitol Square was private religious speech,
and fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private
expression.94
KKK's display, that there was no appearance of endorsement of religion and that
the reasonable observer should conclude that the government was merely expres-
sing its toleration of religious and secular pluralism in the public forum. Pinette v.
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1182, 1187 (S.D. Ohio 1993),
affd, 30 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994), affd, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995). The Court added
that "freedom of speech would be meaningless if it did not apply equally to all
groups, popular and unpopular alike." Id. at 1188.
92. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D. Ohio
1993), affd, 30 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994), affd, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995). Adhering to
its decision in Americans United, the Sixth Circuit held that truly private religious
expression in a truly public forum could not be seen as endorsement by a reason-
able observer. See Capitol Square, 30 F.3d at 679. The Sixth Circuit also concluded
that religious groups, as well as groups communicating controversial messages,
cannot be selectively denied access to a public forum in the name of the Establish-
ment Clause. Id.
93. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2444. Because the issue was not presented on
appeal, the Supreme Court declined to address the question of whether the Board
denied the KKK's permit because of the state's disagreement with the political
content of the message, as opposed to its religious significance. Id. at 2445.
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas outlined that while the issue was not
raised on appeal and would not be decided by the Court, it was worth noting that
"[t]he cross is associated with the Klan not because of the Klan's religious worship,
but because of the Klan's practice of cross-burning." Id. at 2450 (Thomas, J., con-
curring). Justice Thomas suggested that in his mind, the case may not truly have
been one involving the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2451.
94. Id. at 2446 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2143-49 (1993)) (holding that First Amendment protected
church access to school premises which had traditionally been public forum, for
public viewing of religious film, because showing occurred after school hours, did
not have school sponsorship and remained open to public); see also Westside Com-
munity Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) (determining that estab-
lishment of religious club in school that has recognized groups of all varieties was
protected by First Amendment and did not violate Establishment Clause); Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (establishing that First Amendment protected reli-
gious group's right to meet in university facilities which had traditionally been
open to wide variety of student groups; noting that Establishment Clause does not
bar policy of equal access to facilities that are open to variety of groups for
messages which are protected by First Amendment); Heffron v. International Soc'y
[Vol. 41: p. 559
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In reaching this conclusion, however, the plurality noted that speech
which is constitutionally protected against state suppression is not thereby
accorded a guaranteed forum on all property owned by the state.95 In
fact, the right to use government property for one's private expression
depends upon whether the property, has by law or tradition, been given
the status of a public forum.9 6 Both the District Court and the Court of
Appeals classified Capitol Square as a "traditional public forum."97 Conse-
quently, the Capitol Square plurality cited Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n,98 for the proposition that expression may only be regu-
lated in a public forum if such a restriction is necessary to serve a compel-
ling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.9 9
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981) (holding that First
Amendment protects communication of Krishna religious views in public areas).
The Capitol Square plurality noted that in Anglo-American history, government
suppression of speech had so commonly been directed precisely at religious forms
of speech, that accordingly it has not excluded "religious proselytizing" or acts of
worship from free-speech protections. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446. In es-
sence, the plurality found that the "free-speech clause without religion would be
Hamlet without the prince." Id.
95. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446 (citing Postal Serv. v. Council of Green-
burgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (holding that residents did not have
constitutional right to place unstamped material in mailboxes for correspon-
dence); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)
(stating that Court has never held nor suggested that students, teachers or anyone
else has absolute constitutional right to use all parts of school building or its "envi-
rons" for unlimited expressive purposes; noting that First Amendment does not
require equivalent access to all parts of school building in which some form of
communicative activity occurs)).
96. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Educ. Fund, Inc. 473 U.S. 788, 788 (1985)). In Cornelius, the Court noted
that speech protected by the First Amendment is not equally permissible in all
places and at all times. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799. The Cornelius Court opined that:
Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant ac-
cess to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of
Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to
the disruption that might be caused by the speaker's activities. Recogniz-
ing that the Government, 'no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated,' the Court has adopted a forum analysis as a means of
determining when the Government's interest in limiting the use of its
property to its intended purpose outweighs the interest of those wishing
to use the property for other purposes.
Id. at 799-800 (citations omitted) (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836
(1976)).
Thus, the extent to which the government can control access to its property
for certain activities depends upon the nature of the relevant forum. Id. at 800.
For a discussion of the various fora designated by the Court, see supra notes 5-6
and accompanying text.
97. Pinette v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1182, 1184
(S.D. Ohio 1993), affd, 30 F.3d. 675, 678 (6th Cir. 1994), aff'd, 115 S. Ct. 2440
(1995).
98. 460 U.S. 37 (1985).
99. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45) (holding that
in quintessential public fora, government may not prohibit all communicative ac-
1996] NOTE
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1. The Compelling-State-Interest Defense
While the Capitol Square plurality acknowledged that compliance with
the Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling tojustify
content-based restrictions on speech, it concluded that no such interest
was implicated here. 10 0 Recalling Widmar and Lamb's Chapel, the plurality
noted that it had twice previously addressed the combination of: (1) pri-
vate religious expression; (2) a forum available for public use; (3) content-
based regulation; and (4) a state's interest in complying with the Establish-
tivity; in fact, right of state to limit expressive activity in such areas is sharply cir-
cumscribed). In addition to permitting content-based exclusions by a showing that
a regulation is necessary andnarrowly drawn, the Pery court noted that the state
may also enforce regulations of time, place and manner of expression which are
"content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication." Perry, 460 U.S. at 45
(citation omitted).
Perry distinguished the standard applied for the regulation of expression in
traditional public fora from the regulation of speech in nonpublic fora. Id. at 46.
Property owned by the government that is not a traditional public forum may be
reserved by the state for "its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as
long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress ex-
pression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id.
Because the principal purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange
of ideas, the lower courts found Capitol Square, as stipulated by Ohio statute, to be
a "traditional public forum," and subject to its heightened standard of review. See
Capitol Square, 844 F. Supp. at 1184; see also Capitol Square, 30 F.3d at 678.
The petitioners in Capitol Square did not claim that their denial of respon-
dents' application was based upon a content-neutral time, place or manner restric-
tion. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446. Rather, they conceded that the Board
rejected the display precisely because of its religious content. Id. Its single justifi-
cation for denying the KKK's request to display its cross in the Square was the
state's interest in avoiding official endorsement of religion, as required by the Es-
tablishment Clause. Id.
100. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,
271 (1981)) (determining that university's interest in complying with its constitu-
tional obligations to Establishment Clause may be characterized as "compelling");
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Area Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148-49
(citing Widmar for proposition that compliance with Establishment Clause can con-
stitute compelling interest under Perry analysis).
[Vol. 41: p. 559
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 41, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol41/iss2/5
1996] NOTE 583
ment Clause. 101 In both instances, the Supreme Court struck down the
restriction on religious content.'0 2
In Lamb's Chapel, the Court rejected the state's compelling-state-inter-
est Establishment Clause defense because the school property in question
was open to a variety of uses, the school district was not sponsoring the
religious activity and any benefit to religion was merely incidental.10 3 The
Court's decision in Lamb's Chapel reaffirmed its reasoning in Widmar, in
101. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446-48. At issue in Lamb's Chapel was (1)
a church's request to use school facilities for a religiously oriented film series; (2)
after-school use of public school facilities; (3) an exclusion of the film series from
the premises because it articulated a religiously oriented message; and (4) an asser-
tion of Establishment Clause concerns as justification for the exclusion. Lamb's
Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2141. The Lamb's Chapel Court held that even though the
school property during off hours was not a "traditional public forum," the school
district violated the applicant's free speech rights by denying it use of the facilities
solely because of the religious viewpoint of the program they wished to present. Id.
at 2143-49.
Similarly, the situation in Widmar involved (1) a student religious group which
sought to use university property for its meetings; (2) the university which had
allowed various groups to use the facilities in the past; (3) the university's denial of
the group's requested use of the facilities, solely because of their religious purpose;
and (4) the university's defense of its action by asserting Establishment Clause jus-
tification. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273. The Widmar Court reasoned that a university
could not exclude a religious organization from facilities used by other student
groups, simply because the group espoused a religious message. Id. at 269-74.
102. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2446-47. The Supreme Court rejected Estab-
lishment Clause justification for the restrictions on religious speech in both cases,
because content-based discrimination against religious speech in generally open
fora is not protected by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id. In
each case, the Court held that "incidental" benefits to religion do not implicate
Establishment Clause concerns. Id. at 2447.
103. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2143-49. In Lamb's Chapel, the Court recog-
nized that a total ban on using district property for religious purposes could sur-
vive a First Amendment challenge only if excluding that category of speech was (1)
reasonable and (2) viewpoint neutral. Id. at 2147 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense of Educ. Fund, Inc., 472 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). The Court, how-
ever, found no such Establishment Clause justification for the exclusion, stating
that "there would have been no realistic danger that the community would think
that the district was endorsing religion or any particular creed." Id. at 2148.
In addition, the Lamb's Chapel Court determined that the restriction would not
have constituted an establishment of religion under the three-part Lemon standard.
Id. "The challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, does not have the
principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster
an excessive entanglement with religion." Id. (footnote omitted).
Because the film dealt with child rearing and family values, the Court noted
that absent its religious sponsorship, the film would not have been prohibited for
any social or civic reasons; thus, the exclusion was neither reasonable nor view-
point neutral. Id. at 2147. This sort of subject matter discrimination, without Es-
tablishment Clause justification, does not withstand First Amendment review
under Cornelius. Id.
The Lamb's Chapel Court quoted Judge Posner for the proposition that "to
discriminate 'against a particular point of view ... would.., flunk the test... [of]
Cornelius, provided that the defendants have no defense based on the establish-
ment clause."' Id. at 2148 (quoting May v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch., Corp., 787
F.2d 1105, 1114 (7th Cir. 1986)).
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which it stated that "an open forum in a public university does not confer
any imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices." 10 4 The
Capitol Square plurality determined that the factors they considered deter-
minative in Lamb's Chapel and Widmar were also present in the instant
case.
1 0 5
2. The "Setting" of the Religious Expression
Arriving at this conclusion, the plurality in Capitol Square rejected the
petitioner's attempt to distinguish the present situation from Lamb's Chapel
and Widmar, based upon the forum's proximity to the seat of govern-
ment.1 0 6 In doing so, the plurality rejected the petitioner's application of
104. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274). The
Widmar Court established that once a public entity such as a public university
opens its facilities to use by student groups, the question becomes not whether the
creation of a religious forum would violate the Establishment Clause, but rather,
whether the university can exclude groups because of the content of their speech.
See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 273 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)).
In Widmar, the Court answered this question by asserting that such an exclu-
sion could only be justified by the Establishment Clause if the group's use of the
forum violated the Clause's prohibition against the "primary advancement" of reli-
gion. Id. This, the Court concluded, could not be the case where the primary
effect of the public forum, open to all forms of discourse, was not to advance reli-
gion. Id.
Because it is possible, or even foreseeable, that religious groups will benefit
from access to university facilities, such benefits do not violate the Establishment
Clause's prohibition against the primary advancement of religion. Id. (citing Roe-
mer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422 (1961)). Thus, such "incidental" benefits do not
generate Establishment Clause concerns. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
The Widmar Court determined that any religious benefit of an open forum at
the university would be "incidental" because of two telling factors. Id. First, an
open forum in a public university does not confer any state approval on religious
messages. Id. According to the Court, "such a policy would no more commit the
University... to religious goals than it is now committed to the religious goals of
the Students for a Democratic Society, the Young Socialist Alliance, or any other
group eligible to use its facilities." Id. (citation omitted).
Second, the forum is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as reli-
gious speakers (over 100 groups are recognized at the university). Id. The Widmar
Court noted that benefits to such a broad spectrum of groups is an important
index of secular effect. Id. The Court stated, "[i]f the Establishment Clause
barred the extension of general benefits to religious groups, a church could not be
protected by the police and fire departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in
repair." Id. at 274-75 (citing Roemer, 426 U.S. at 747).
105. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447. The Capitol Square plurality con-
cluded that there was no violation of the Establishment Clause sufficient to consti-
tute a "compelling state interest" after considering a multitude of factors: (1) the
state did not sponsor the KKK's expression; (2) the expression occured on govern-
ment property that had been opened to the public for speech; and (3) permission
was requested through the same application process and on the same terms re-
quired of other private groups. Id.
106. Id. The petitioners in Capitol Square argued that by applying the endorse-
ment test to the instant case, the Court should find that because of the forum's
proximity to the seat of government, an observer might mistake private expression
[Vol. 41: p. 559
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the endorsement test, writing that "[w]here we have tested for endorse-
ment of religion, the subject of the test was either expression by the govern-
ment itself, or else government action alleged to discriminate in favor of
private religious expression or activity." 107
Responding to the petitioner's reliance on Allegheny County and Lynch,
the Capitol Square plurality stated that each was easily distinguished from
the case at bar.' 0 8 The plurality made clear that the site used for display of
a cr6che in Allegheny County was expressly different from the kind of public
forum at issue in Capitol Square.10 9 For instance, the staircase in Allegheny
County was not open to all on equal terms in the way that Capitol Square
had been. 110 Had this been the case, noted the Capitol Square plurality,
for officially endorsed religious expression, in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Id. Thus, petitioners argued that the state's content-based restriction of
the cross, enforced in an effort to satisfy Establishment Clause concerns, was con-
stitutional. Id. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 598-602 (1989) (espousing view that religious display must be viewed in its
overall context); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (asserting that Establish-
ment Clause analysis must take into account context of display in question).
107. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447 (citing Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994)) (emphasis added). The plu-
rality criticized petitioners' use of the term "endorsement," stating that what peti-
tioners proposed was not really an endorsement test of any sort, much less Justice
O'Connor's formulation. Id. The Capitol Square plurality stated that:
"Endorsement" connotes an expression or demonstration of approval or
support. Our cases have accordingly equated "endorsement" with "pro-
motion" or "favoritism." We find it peculiar to say that government "pro-
motes" or "favors" a religious display by giving it the same access to a
public forum that all other displays enjoy. And as a matter of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence, we have consistently held that it is no viola-
tion for government to enact neutral policies that happen to benefit
religion.
Id. (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)).
The Capitol Square plurality noted that the test which petitioners proposed,
which would attribute to a neutrally behaving government private religious expres-
sion, had no antecedent in our jurisprudence and would better be called a "trans-
ferred endorsement test." See id. at 2448 (explaining that cases upon which petitioners
rely for this proposition, Allegheny County and Lynch, are easily distinguished).
108. Id.
109. Id. In Allegheny County, the creche sat on the Grand Staircase, in "the
main and most beautiful part of the building that is the seat of county govern-
ment." Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 599. "No viewer could reasonably think that it
occupies this location without the support and approval of the government. Thus,
by permitting the 'display of the creche in this particular setting,' the county sends
an unmistakable message that it supports and promotes the Christian praise to
God that is the creche's religious message." Id. at 599-600. (quoting Lynch, 465
U.S. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
In contrast, the forum at issue in Capitol Square was outside the seat of govern-
ment, and in an area that had traditionally been used for conveying various private
messages. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2440.
110. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2448. In Allegheny County, the Court deter-
mined that the Grand Staircase was not in the type of location that allowed all
parties to freely express their messages in displays for weeks at a time, and as such,
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"the presence of the creche in that location for over six weeks would then
not serve to associate the government with the creche."' I
3. Private Speech Versus Government Speech
The Capitol Square plurality also concluded that the petitioner's reli-
ance on Lynch was misplaced." 2 Conceding that the government's use of
religious symbols is unconstitutional if it effectively endorses sectarian reli-
gious beliefs, the plurality rejected the notion that Lynch holds, or even
remotely assumes, that "the government's neutral treatment of private reli-
gious expression can be unconstitutional."" 3
any display located there may fairly be understood to express views that receive the
support and endorsement of the government. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 600
n.50. Thus, the Allegheny County Court determined that the effect of a display, and
therefore its constitutionality, turned on its setting. Id. at 598.
With respect to the staircase setting of the creche, the Allegheny County Court
distinguished this display location from those that courts had found permissible in
other Establishment Clause inquiries. Id. at 600 n.50. See, e.g., Board of Trustees
of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985) (determining that public park pro-
vided suitable public forum for display of criche); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668 (conclud-
ing that public park was acceptable public forum for Christmas display containing
creche); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) (establishing that university
buildings were permissive public forum for religious message).
111. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2448. Because the staircase was not open to
all on an equal basis in the way that permissible public fora had been opened in
the past for private religious expression, the Court in Allegheny County determined
that the county was favoring sectarian religious expression by displaying the creche
in that location, in violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. Thus, the Court
deemed the display to be unconstitutional governmental "endorsement" of the
communication of a particular religious message. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601. The
Allegheny County Court noted that had the physical setting been different (such as
in Lynch v. Donnelly or Board of Trustees of Scarsdale v. McCreary), the display would
have been permissible. Id. at 600 n.50.
112. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2448. In Lynch, the Court stipulated that in
order to withstand an Establishment Clause challenge, Lemon required only that a
religious display have a secular purpose. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681 n.6. The test,
therefore, does not demand that a display have only secular motives. Id. The Lynch
Court stated, "[wiere the test that the government must have 'exclusively secular'
objectives, much of the conduct and legislation this Court has approved in the past
would have been invalidated." Id.
113. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2448. Lynch stands for the proposition that
the Court can invalidate legislation or government action on the ground that a
"secular purpose" is lacking, only when the Court has concluded that there is no
question that the statute or activity is motivated wholly by religious concerns. Lynch,
465 U.S. at 680; see also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1980) (holding that
posting of Ten Commandments had no secular purpose and was unconstitu-
tional); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107-09 (1968) (finding prohibition on
teaching theory of evolution in public schools unconstitutional because it served
no secular purpose); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-34 (1963)
(holding policy of requiring passages of Bible to be read in public schools uncon-
stitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1962) (concluding that use of
Regents Prayer in public school system breached constitutional wall between
church and state).
The Lynch Court noted that even in cases where the benefits to religion have
been substantial, as long as there has been a discernible secular purpose to the
[Vol. 41: p. 559
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Thus, the plurality in Capitol Square concluded that what distinguishes
Allegheny County and Lynch from Widmar and Lamb's Chapel, is "the differ-
ence between government speech and private speech." 114 The plurality
made the distinction that while government speech endorsing religion is
forbidden by the Establishment Clause, private speech endorsing religion
is fully protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment. 115 This distinction, noted the plurality, does not disappear
whenever private speech can be mistaken for government speech.1 16
display, there has been no Establishment Clause violation. See, e.g., Tilton v. Rich-
ardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677-78 (1971) (determining that Education Act which pro-
vided federal funding to religiously affiliated schools was consititutional because
their religious affiliations did not interfere with their secular educational func-
tions); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970) (upholding property tax
exemptions in New York state for properties used solely for religious worship);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (concluding that statute
which required public school board to lend books free of charge to public as well
as private schools did not violate Establishment Clause); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (establishing that use of tax funds to subsidize transportation
of private school children did not violate Establishment Clause); cf. Larkin v. Gren-
del's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (holding that statute which allowed
churches to prevent issuances of liquor licenses to establishments within five-hun-
dred feet of their premises violated Establishment Clause).
In Lynch, the Court stated:
It would be ironic.., if the inclusion of a single symbol of a particular
historic religious event [Christmas], as part of a celebration acknowl-
edged in the Western World for 20 centuries, and in this country by the
people, by the Executive Branch, by the Congress, and the courts for 2
centuries, would so "taint" the city's exhibit as to render it violative of the
Establishment Clause. To forbid the use of this one passive symbol-the
creche-at the very time people are taking note of the season with Christ-
mas hymns and carols in public schools and other public places, and
while the Congress and legislatures open sessions with prayers by paid
chaplains, would be a stilted overreaction contrary to our history and to
our holdings. If the presence of the creche in this display violates the
Establishment Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note of
Christmas, and of our religious heritage, are equally offensive to the
Constitution.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 686. The Court added that the fears and political problems that
gave rise to the Religion Clauses in the eighteenth century are of far less concern
today. Id. "Any notion that these symbols pose a real danger of establishment of a
state church is farfetched indeed." Id.
114. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2448 (emphasis added). Both Widmar and
Lamb's Chapel involved private groups seeking to convey a religiously oriented
message on public fora owned by the state. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2144-45 (1993); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264-65.
In contrast, Allegheny County and Lynch concerned state-owned holiday symbols
that conveyed a religious message while displayed on property owned by the state.
See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 579; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 668.
115. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2448. In Capitol Square, the plurality stated
that "[b]y its terms [the Establishment] Clause applies only to the words and acts
of government. It was never meant, and has never been read by this Court, to serve
as an impediment to purely private religious speech connected to the State only
through its occurrence in a public forum." Id. at 2449.
116. Id. at 2448. In Capitol Square, the petitioner asserted that the distinction
between private and religious speech endorsing religion disappears whenever the
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Arriving at this conclusion, the plurality in Capitol Square explicitly re-
jected the "transferred endorsement test" as a viable means of Establish-
ment Clause interpretation.1 17 The plurality noted that "lilt has radical
implications for our public policy to suggest that neutral laws are invalid
whenever hypothetical observers may-even reasonably---confuse an inci-
dental benefit to religion with state endorsement." 118 Thus, the state may
private speech occurs too close to the seat of government. Id. In other words,
petitioner argued that when private speech is too close to a seat of government, it
can be mistaken for government speech. Id.
The Capitol Square plurality responded that this proposition cannot be ac-
cepted, especially where, as here, the government has not fostered or encouraged
the mistake. Id. Although the plurality acknowledged that one can conceive of a
situation where "governmental favoritism" could be an issue (where for instance a
governmental entity manipulates the administration of a public forum close to a
seat of government in such a manner that a religious group would receive prefer-
ential treatment, thereby creating an impression of endorsement), such a situation
does not exist here. Id. at 2449.
Thus, the plurality concluded that because Capitol Square is genuinely known
to be a public forum and has been widely used as such for many years, "[p]rivate
religious speech [in such a forum] cannot be subject to veto by those who see
favoritism where there is none." Id.
117. Id. at 2448-50. The Capitol Square plurality termed the petitioner's argu-
ment as the "transferred endorsement test," meaning that petitioner seeks to attri-
bute private religious expression to a neutrally behaving government. Id. at 2448-49.
The plurality rejected this standard because it concluded that such a principle
cannot be restricted to relevant situations. Id. at 2449. In effect, such a standard
would nullify the distinction between private and government speech. Id. Using
Lamb's Chapel and Widmar as illustrations, the plurality in Capitol Square argued that
under the petitioner's transferred endorsement test, school districts and state uni-
versities adopting open forum policies in the future would be forced to guess
whether some "undetermined critical mass" of the community might perceive the
school as advocating a religious viewpoint. Id.
The plurality argued that under such a standard, every proposed act of private
religious expression in a public forum would force officials to weigh a host of im-
ponderables, including: (1) How close to government is too close? and (2) What
kind of building and in what context symbolizes state authority? Id. Moreover, the
plurality noted that institutions would face a no-win situation, guilty of an Estab-
lishment Clause violation if they guessed wrong in one direction, or liable for sup-
pressing free speech or the free exercise thereof, if they guessed wrong in the
opposite direction. Id.
118. Id. at 2449-50 (emphasis added). It is for this reason that the Capitol
Square plurality found endorsement to provide no test whatsoever for Establish-
ment Clause inquiries of this sort. Id. at 2450 n.3. The plurality explained that it
granted certiorari precisely because of the differing decisions arrived at in the
lower courts, resulting from varying applications of the endorsement standard. Id.
The Capitol Square plurality intimated that the endorsement test's "reasonable
observer" construction demonstrates the standard's most significant flaw. Id. If
different judges are unable to reach a consensus as to whether this observer is any
beholder, the average beholder, or the ultra-reasonable beholder, the plurality
asks how juries, legislators, public forum administrators and private citizens are to
walk about this "minefield." Id. (referring to debate between Justice Stevens in
dissent and Justice O'Connor in concurrence, regarding level of knowledge rea-
sonable observer should be understood to possess). See id. at 2469-70 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that not all reasonable viewers of display would know all
about history of Capitol Square); see also id. at 2454-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
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not, on the claim of misperception of official endorsement, ban all private
religious speech from the public square, or discriminate against it by re-
quiring religious speech alone to disclaim public sponsorship." 9
4. The Concurrences
Writing for the concurrence, Justice O'Connor responded to the plu-
rality's newly created per se rule for private religious displays in the public
forum by asserting that such line drawing is counterproductive to Estab-
lishment Clause interpretation. 12 0 Justice O'Connor argued that the en-
dorsement test supplies the appropriate standard for Establishment Clause
inquiries, and that the plurality had erroneously taken an exceedingly nar-
row view of the Clause, which was out of step with well established notions
of what the Constitution requires.1 2 ' Thus, Justice O'Connor saw no ne-
(advocating that reasonable observer in endorsement inquiries must be deemed
aware of history and context of display).
119. Id. at 2450. The Capitol Square plurality noted that it would be a sad day
when private religious speech is exiled to a realm of minimal protection, on par
with pornography and private expletives. Id. at 2449. See, e.g., Young v. American
Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 73 (1976) (finding zoning statute which prohib-
ited adult theatres did not violate Constitution); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,
26 (1971) (holding that defendant wearing jacket bearing words "Fuck the Draft"
could not be prosecuted for criminal offense).
Private religious speech being relegated to the level of protection enjoyed by
pornography would be merely disturbing, wrote the plurality, "were religious
speech simply as protected by the Constitution as other forms of private speech."
Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2449 (emphasis added). But, "it is outright perverse
when one considers that private religious expression enjoys preferential treatment
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment." Id. (emphasis added).
"If Ohio is concerned with misperceptions, wrote the Capitol Square plurality,
nothing prevents it from requiring all private displays in the Square to be identi-
fied as such." Id. This, the plurality stated, is constitutional "content-neutral man-
ner restriction." Id.; see Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 293 (1984) (holding that oral, written or symbolic expression is subject to
content-neutral, reasonable time, place and manner restrictions).
120. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2456. Justice O'Connor cited Allegheny County
for the proposition that Establishment Clause analysis depends upon a sensitivity
to the unique circumstances and context of a particular challenged practice. Id.
(citing Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 629 (1989)).
In her view, "this flexibility is a virtue and not a vice; 'courts must keep in mind
both the fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional
scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values can be
eroded."' Id. (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
121. Id. at 2454. Justice O'Connor indicated that every government practice
must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes a
violation of the Establishment Clause. Id. As such, she argued that an Establish-
ment Clause inquiry cannot be distilled into a fixed per se rule. Id. Justice
O'Connor noted that the endorsement test has been applied by numerous lower
courts in precisely the context currently before the Court. Id. at 2453. See, e.g.,
Chabad-Lubavitch of Ga. v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (applying endorse-
ment test to exhibition of menorah on public plaza during Chanukah); Kreisner v.
San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 781-82 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying endorsement test to dis-
play of scenes from New Testament in public park), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 690
(1994); Americans United for the Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand
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cessity to carve out, as the plurality opinion suggested, an exception to the
endorsement test for the public forum context of private expression. 122
In fact, Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment only because she
concluded that her endorsement test's "reasonable observer" would be
fully aware that Capitol Square was a public area open to all. As such,
Justice O'Connor reasoned that this observer would not perceive the
KKK's cross display as government endorsement of religion.' 2 3
Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538, 1553 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that display of private meno-
rah in traditional public forum did not constitute endorsement of religion); Smith
v. County of Albermarle, Va., 895 F.2d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying endorse-
ment test to erection of nativity scene on front lawn of county office building);
Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989) (determining constitu-
tionality of menorah placed in city hall park during Chanukah by endorsement
analysis).
122. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2453. Justice O'Connor disagreed that it has
radical implications for public policy to suggest that neutral laws are invalid when-
ever hypothetical observers may-even reasonably-confuse an incidental benefit
to religion with state endorsement. Id. at 2454. Justice O'Connor wrote that "the
Establishment Clause forbids a state from hiding behind the application of for-
mally neutral criteria and remaining studiously oblivious to the effects of its actions
... [as] not all state policies are permissible under the Religion Clauses simply
because they are neutral in form." Id. Thus, she asserted that the Establishment
Clause imposes affirmative obligations on states, which may require them to take
active steps to avoid being perceived as endorsing a private religious message. Id.
Justice O'Connor therefore argued that Establishment Clause questions can-
not be answered in the abstract with a per se construction, rather, such questions
require courts to examine the history and administration of a particular practice to
determine whether or not it operates as an endorsement. Id.
123. Id. at 2456 (O'Conner,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Justice O'Connor noted that although she and Justice Stevens each used
the endorsement test to arrive at different results, this occurred because of a de-
parture between the two concerning the knowledge attributable to the test's "rea-
sonable observer." Id. at 2454-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
Justice O'Connor wrote that the endorsement inquiry is not about the percep-
tions of particular individuals, or of saving isolated nonadherents from the discom-
fort of viewing symbols of faith to which they do not subscribe. Id. at 2455
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). "[W]e do not
ask whether there is any person who could find an endorsement of religion,
whether some people may be offended by the display, or whether some reasonable
person might think [the State] endorses religion." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Rather, stated Justice O'Connor, the inquiry must be conducted from the per-
spective of a "reasonable observer" who is presumed to possess a certain level of
knowledge within the community. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment). This knowledge would include the history and context
of the forum, such as: an understanding that the cross is a religious symbol, that
the Square is owned by the state, that the building adjacent to the display is the
seat of government and that the forum has been host to various displays over the
years. Id. at 2455-56 (O'Connor, J, concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Such an approach, argued Justice O'Connor, does not require the "ultra-
reasonable observer" that Justice Stevens appeared to incorporate in his dissent.
Id. at 2456 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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Joining the concurrence, Justice Souter also rejected the notion of a
per se rule governing Establishment Clause interpretation. 124 Citing
Mergens and Allegheny County, Justice Souter argued that earlier decisions
properly shied away from an irrebutable presumption regarding Establish-
ment Clause analysis. Instead, these decisions involved contextual judg-
ments dependent upon the unique circumstances and context of the
specific case. 125 Justice Souter asserted that the endorsement test is the
appropriate mode of inquiry because "in some circumstances an intelli-
gent observer may mistake private, unattended religious displays in a pub-
lic forum for government speech endorsing religion." 126
124. Id. at 2457 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). Justice Souter argued that the Court cannot dismiss Allegheny County's en-
dorsement test as "applying only to situations in which there is an allegation that
the Establishment Clause has been violated through 'expression by the govern-
ment itself' or 'government action ... discriminat[ing in favor of private religious
expression,"' because such a distinction would make meaningless the "'effect-of-
endorsing"' part of Allegheny County. Id. at 2458 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted) (quoting Justice Scalia's plurality
opinion in Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2447).
Justice Souter argued that the effects of endorsement matter to Establishment
Clause analysis, and that the best way to assess such effects is by asking whether or
not the practice in question creates the "appearance" of endorsement to the rea-
sonable observer. Id. at 2458-59 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (citing Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
630 (1989) (O'Conner, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment));
Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Souter indicated that "[u]nless we are able to retreat entirely to gov-
ernment intent and abandon consideration of effects, it makes no sense to recog-
nize a public perception of endorsement as a harm only in that subclass of cases in
which the government owns the display." Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2459 (Souter,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2459 (Souter, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment). Justice Souter suggested that the "significance of the
fact that the Court in Allegheny County did not intend to lay down a per se rule in
the way suggested by the plurality today, has been confirmed by subsequent cases."
Id. at 2459 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2146-49
(1993) (looking at specific circumstances of private religious speech and public
fora at issue, and examining endorsement effects of situation); Westside Commu-
nity Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 235-53 (1990) (applying endorsement
analysis and taking into account particular context and circumstances of case,
which involved private religious speech in nondiscriminatory limited open forum);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271-75 (1981) (illustrating that although case was
decided before Court's adoption of endorsement test in Allegheny, its reasoning fits
within standard because Court looked at Lemon and focused primarily on its "ef-
fects prong").
126. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2457 (Souter, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment). An observer need not be "obtuse," stated Justice Souter,
to presume that an unattended display on government land, in front of a govern-
ment building, either belongs to government, represents government speech, or
enjoys that position because of government endorsement of its message. Id. at
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5. The Dissent
For the dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Establishment Clause
should be construed as creating a strong presumption against the installa-
tion of unattended religious symbols on public property.1 27 Concluding
that this presumption had not been overcome in the present case, Justice
Stevens stated that "[wihen the message is religious in character, it is a
message the state can neither send nor reinforce without violating the Es-
tablishment Clause[;] ... [t]he existence of a 'public forum' in itself can-
not dispel the message of endorsement."1 28 Thus, Justice Stevens
2458 (Souter,J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Sou-
ter noted:
Given the domination of the square by the government's own displays
[i.e., permanent statues and flags], one would not be a dimwit as a matter
of law to think that an unattended religious display there was endorsed by
the government, even though the square has also been the site of three
privately sponsored, unattended displays over the years.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Although
Justice Souter supported the endorsement test as the proper mode of inquiry for
Establishment Clause interpretation, he concurred with the plurality opinion in
Capitol Square because he opined a flat denial of the KKK's application was not the
Board's only option in protecting against the appearance of endorsement. Id. at
2461 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
Justice Souter noted that under Perry, a government seeking to restrict speech
in a public forum must find the most "'narrowly drawn"' alternative. Id. (Souter,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). Justice Souter outlined
two possibilities that would have suited the situation in Capitol Square better than
an outright ban: (1) a disclaimer could have been placed alongside the display,
explaining that the cross was erected by private individuals without government
support or (2) the Board could have instituted a policy of restricting all private
unattended displays to one area of the Square, with a permanent sign indicating
that the area was a forum for private speech without government endorsement. Id.
at 2461-62 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). With
such alternatives available, argued Justice Souter, the flat denial of the KKK's appli-
cation was unconstitutional. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
127. Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice
Stevens invoked Jefferson's "wall of separation" between church and state. Id. at
2464-65 (Stevens,J., dissenting). He stated that although Capitol Square had been
used as a public forum, and although it has been host to private sectarian displays
in the past, neither fact provided a sufficient basis for rebutting the presumption
against religious symbols on public property. Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
He concluded, therefore, that neither respect for the Establishment Clause, nor
for precedent, justified the conclusion of the plurality. Id. at 2465 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
At the very least, stated Justice Stevens, the Establishment Clause "'prohibits
government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief' or
from 'making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in
the political community."' Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Allegheny County,
492 U.S. at 593-94).
128. Id. at 2469 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens asserted that the "lo-
cation" of a stationary and unattended display is both a component of its message,
and an implicit endorsement of that message by the party who maintains control
of the location. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
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concluded that because a religious symbol in Capitol Square would have
the "principal and primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion," and
because some reasonable observers would attribute this religious message
to the state, such a display violated the Establishment Clause and was
unconstitutional. 1
29
B. Critical Analysis
The plurality decision in Capitol Square brings a much needed degree
of predictability to an area of constitutional law that has been plagued by
inconsistency and confusion. 130 The per se rule announced by the plural-
Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1516 (1995) (determining that party which allows
message to be conveyed on their property has autonomy to choose content of
message); City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (1994) (establishing that
sign's location is significant component of message it conveys). Justice Stevens
therefore concluded that "[t] he very fact that a sign is installed on public property
implies official recognition and reinforcement of its message." Capitol Square, 115
S. Ct. at 2467 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This implication is especially strong, wrote
Justice Stevens, when the sign stands in front of the seat of government. Id. (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that "the State may have granted a vari-
ety of groups permission to engage in uncensored expressive activities in front of
the capitol building does not, in my opinion, qualify or contradict the normal
inference of endorsement that the reasonable observer would draw from the unat-
tended, freestanding sign or symbol." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, because
structures located on government property imply state approval of their message,
the government must have considerable leeway regarding which sorts of displays it
allows, and which it forbids. Id. at 2468 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Although the
First Amendment requires the Government to allow leafletting or demonstrating
outside its buildings, the state has greater power to exclude unattended symbols
when they convey a type of message with which the state does not wish to be identi-
fied." Id. at 2468 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2470 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Embracing the
endorsement test, Justice Stevens concluded that when religious symbols are in-
volved, the question of whether the state is appearing to take a position is best
judged from the standpoint of the reasonable observer. Id. at 2466 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). "If a reasonable person could perceive government endorsement of
religion from a private display, then the State may not allow its property to be used
as a forum for that display." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens asserted that a display violates the Establishment Clause if some
reasonable observers would attribute the message to the state. Id. at 2470 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that the majority erred, because it assumed
that all reasonable observers would have knowledge of the history of the Square as
a public forum. Id. at 2470-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, Justice Stevens distinguished Capitol Square from Widmar and
Lamb's Chapel Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). He noted that in each of those cases,
historical knowledge of the forum at issue was unnecessary. Id. at 2471 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). "The primary difference is that in this case we are dealing with a visual
display-a symbol readily associated with a religion, in a venue readily associated
with the State." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130. Parish, supra note 7, at 254. Parish notes that the Supreme Court at-
tempted to clarify Establishment Clause analysis in the 1980's with its decisions in
Lynch and Allegheny County. Id. at 254 n.10 (citing Allegheny County v. Greater
Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
Unfortunately, these attempts have left courts, litigants and scholars confused. Id.
at 254. The current situation in Establishment Clause jurisprudence was summa-
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ity for private religious expression in public fora strikes the appropriate
constitutional balance between Establishment Clause preservation, and
Free Speech and Exercise Clause protection.1 3' The Capitol Square hold-
ing rescues Establishment Clause jurisprudence from the quagmire of sub-
jectivity created by the Lemon, endorsement and coercion analyses, and
focuses the Court's inquiry instead on the language, intent and purpose of
the First Amendment. l3 2
Each of these judicial standards, employed by the Supreme Court in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence over the last twenty-five years, has
been ill-suited to resolving issues such as the one presented in Capitol
Square--namely, that of private religious speech in government controlled
public fora. l3 3 The Lemon test's premise, that a "wall of separation" exists
rized by Parish in a quotation from an attorney for the City of Burlington, who
upon begging a judge for some clarity on the subject during a 1990 menorah dis-
pute uttered: "Uust tiell us what's constitutional and we'll act accordingly." Id. at
254 n.11 (citing Laura Decher, Menorah Dispute Heads to Court, BURLINGTON FREE
PREss, Dec. 7, 1990, at BI).
This sense of desperation has been shared by another commentator, who
writes that "[a] more rule-oriented approach would bring more predictability to
this area [of the law] and would provide better guidance to lower courts." Leading
Cases, supra note 4, at 238.
131. For a historical analysis of the appropriate balance between the Estab-
lishment, Free Speech and Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, see infra
notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
132. For a discussion of the inconsistencies created by the subjective nature of
these standards, see infra notes 133-40 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the language, intent and purposes of the First Amendment, see infra notes 141-44
and accompanying text.
133. This situation is perhaps best illustrated by an examination of Allegheny
County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, which addressed two private religious displays in
two separate public fora, leading to two distinctly different holdings. Allegheny
County, 492 U.S. at 579. For this reason, Allegheny County provides a unique oppor-
tunity to examine the flaws of current standards as applied to private religious
expressions located in public fora.
One commentator has addressed the inability of current Establishment Clause
standards to properly adjudicate issues of private religious speech in public fora, as
exemplified by the Court in Allegheny County. Leading Cases, supra note 4, at 229.
Commenting on the Court's decision in Allegheny County, the author notes:
In upholding the display of a menorah while striking down the display of
a creche, the fractured Court provided little guidance for settling dis-
putes in the area. Instead, it chose to function as a constitutional "inte-
rior decorator," divining the constitutionality of each display based on a
highly subjective interpretation of its content and context, and a guess at
what a hypothetical viewer would perceive as the state's message in spon-
soring the display.
Id. Impliedly acknowledging the flaws inherent in the Lemon test, the Allegheny
County Court, in accordance with Lynch, refined Establishment Clause analysis by
paying particular attention to the purpose and effect of the governmental practice.
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 592. The majority's adoption of the endorsement test
instead of the Lemon standard, presents one of the first indications of Lemon's de-
mise in the Establishment Clause arena. For a further discussion of the inherent
flaws of the Lemon analysis, see infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 41: p. 559
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between church and state, has proven to be unworkable and misguided.' 34
As a result, the Lemon prongs have been the subject of much criticism and
modification.1 3 5 Likewise, Justice O'Connor's endorsement test has fallen
In adopting Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, however, the majority
merely substituted one unworkable standard with another, as both share similar
inherent defects. Leading Cases, see supra note 4, at 234. The endorsement test, as
applied in Allegheny County, has been criticized for possessing three basic flaws:
"(1) uncertainty as to who is the relevant person to judge the effect of the govern-
ment act, (2) malleability of results reached by the application of the test due to its
inherent subjectivity and heavy factual dependence, and (3) inability of the test to
account for past decisions of the Court." Id. Fundamentally, the test's greatest
problem is its inability to define endorsement. Id. at 235.
Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy's coercion test fairs no better in its analysis of
private religious displays in public fora. Id. at 237. The test involves "the same fact-
intensive analysis [as the endorsement test] without clear rules to determine how
to weigh the facts." Id.
Thus, for private religious displays in public fora, the Allegheny County Court
succeeded in doing little more than demonstrating the fundamental flaws and in-
adequacies of current Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 239.
134. Bowen, supra note 21, at 130-35. Bowen argues that the Lemon test's
premise of a "wall of separation" between church and state has caused recurrent
problems for the standard. Id. at 133. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch.
Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2149-51 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declining to apply
Lemon to Establishment Clause issue); Texas Monthly, Inc., v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1,
33 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing application of Lemon to deny tax exemp-
tion was not founded on Constitution, precedent or history); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578, 639-40 (1987) (ScaliaJ., dissenting) (criticizing inconsistent applica-
tion of Lemon test); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 419 (1985) (Burger, J., dissent-
ing) (finding application of Lemon criteria to be too formalistic); Mueller v. Allen,
463 U.S. 388, 394 (1983) (stating that Lemon test is nothing but helpful signpost).
Bowen notes that the inherent problem of the Lemon standard is that it greatly
differs from the Framers' intent. Bowen, supra note 21, at 133. Thus, Bowen advo-
cates an abandonment of Lemon, and an adoption of a test that moves away from
the "wall" and closer to the Framers' original understanding of the word "establish-
ment." Id. at 133-34. Such a revision, argues Bowen, requires a careful examina-
tion of relevant historical sources. Id. at 134. This view is shared by Evans, who
notes that while the Lemon test is flawed from a historical perspective, it is also
nearly impossible to apply with any measure of consistency from a practical stand-
point. Evans, supra note 2, at 70.
135. No fewer than five of the current justices sitting on the Supreme Court,
have in their own opinions, criticized the Lemon test. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 579, 630 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing Lemon test); Allegheny
County, 492 U.S. at 655-57 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (same); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church ofJesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (same); School Dist. of the City Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 400
(1985) (White,J., dissenting) (same); Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108-12 (1985)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 90-91 (White, J., dissenting) (same);
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (White, J., dissenting) (same); NewYork v.
Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125, 134-35 (1977) (White, J., dissenting) (same);
Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., con-
curring in judgment) (same); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (same).
Many commentators have argued that Lemon simply fails in certain cases to
distinguish truly troublesome practices from those that pose no threat to the values
of individual religious freedom, and to the mutual non-interference of organized
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prey to the very aspect of its analysis that first won it praise-its subjectiv-
ity.1 6 The test has become nothing more than an opportunity for judges
religion and government that the Establishment Clause seeks to protect. See gener-
ally Donald L. Beschle, Paradigms Lost: The Second Circuit Faces the New Era of Religion
ClauseJurisprudence, 57 BROOK. L. REv. 547, 562 (1991) (noting deficiency of Lemon
test); Bowen, supra note 21, at 134 (arguing that Court should abandon Lemon and
adopt approach derived from Framers' intent); Keith A. Fournier, In the Wake of
Weisman: The Lemon Test is Still a Lemon, But the Psycho-Coercion Test is More Bitter
Stil 2 REGENT U. L. REv. 1 (1992) (examining Lemon's irrationality); Parish, supra
note 7, at 271 (suggesting problems with Lemon analysis); Andrew Rotstein, Good
Faith? Religious-Secular Parallelism and the Establishment Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REv.
1763, 1767 (1993) (demonstrating deficiencies in Lemon); Welton 0. Seal, Jr., Be-
nevolent Neutrality Toward Religion: Still an Elusive Ideal After KiryaJoel v. Grumet, 73
N.C. L. REv. 1641 (1995) (commenting on debate of Lemon's usefulness as Estab-
lishment Clause barometer); Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux,
1992 Sup. CT. REv. 123 (1992); Note, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term-Leading
Cases-Establishment of Religion, 106 HARv. L. REv. 163 (1992).
Rotstein points to the inherent flaws in each of Lemon's three prongs. Rot-
stein, supra at 1767-70. He notes that its "purpose" prong results in a one-sided
focus on the subjective intent of the legislature. Id. at 1768. In addition, he argues
that the "effect" requirement is too formal and inflexible, resulting in the prohibi-
tion of even neutral state policies toward religion. Id. at 1769. Finally, he suggests
that Lemon's "excessive entanglement" prong suffers from a nebulous line between
permissible and impermissible government involvement. Id. at 1769-70.
136. Far from eliminating the inconsistencies and defects which have plagued
the Lemon test and Establishment Clause analysis, the "endorsement test" produces
only further ambiguities and analytical deficiencies. See Neal R. Feigenson, Political
Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An Alternative to Current Establish-
ment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 53, 55 (1990) (criticizing Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test's "objective observer standard" as promoting confu-
sion and failing to achieve its goal of more principled decision-making); Steven D.
Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No
Endorsement" Test, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 266, 267-68 (1988) (arguing that endorsement
test would further ambiguities and analytical deficiencies in Establishment Clause
analyses).
Smith argues that the endorsement test (referred to as the "no endorsement
test") embodies four concepts: endorsement, intent, perception and religion.
Smith, supra at 276. Each of which he argues, are flawed and fail in their applica-
tion. Id.First, Smith illustrates that endorsement, the central concept in Justice
O'Connor's test, is elusive and elastic. Id. He asserts that because there are so
many different concepts of endorsement, none of which have been specifically
adopted or dismissed by Justice O'Connor, the test lapses into a sea of subjectivity.
Id. at 276-78.
Second, Smith articulates that the question of whether government officials
"intend" to endorse religion, suffers from similar difficulties. Id. at 283. The prob-
lem is further exacerbated because such an inquiry asks not only what government
intended, but also, what government intended to communicate. Id. at 286. As such, the
subjective inquiries in such a scheme seem endless. Id.
Third, with regard to "perceptions," Smith poses the question: "Whose per-
ceptions count?" Id. at 291. Thus, the challenge of defining Justice O'Connor's
reasonable observer becomes yet another subjective hurdle. Id. at 293-95.
Finally, defining what actually constitutes "religion" is an additional stumbling
block in Justice O'Connor's formulation. Id. at 295. Smith argues that Justice
O'Connor's test offers an expansive license to dissatisfied citizens holding uncon-
ventional views of religion, to challenge governmental policy on "religious"
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to incorporate their own perceptions and preferences into the jurispru-
dence. 137 Finally, Justice Kennedy's coercion threshold has suffered from
problems that are twofold: First, it is plagued by the same fact intensive
subjectivity that ails the endorsement analysis;1 38 and second, it fails to
embody the essential mandate of the Establishment Clause-"that 'one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.' 1 39
By setting forth standards that amount to little more than multi-factor
balances, the Supreme Court has done little to bring stability to this consti-
grounds. Id. at 300. Accordingly, Smith concludes that the test is composed of
unmanageable or fatally ambiguous concepts, which fail to provide the needed
predictability and guidance to lower courts. Id.
This opinion ofJustice O'Connor's endorsement test has been shared byJus-
tices Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia and White. See Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 655
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Chief Justice Rehnquist,
and Justices Scalia and White joining Justice Kennedy's opinion of endorsement
test). Justice Kennedy's dissent condemned the endorsement test as an unwork-
able standard that "reflects an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility in-
consistent with our history and our precedents." Id. at 655.
137. Leading Cases, supra note 4, at 238. Sharing the dissenters' views in Alle-
gheny County concerning the subjectivity of the endorsement test, Feigenson writes:
[T]he "objective" or "reasonable" observer is, in the final analysis, the
judiciary. Evidence of actual perceptions of government messages by
members of the community "may help" determine whether government
action endorses religion, but clearly are not essential. Justice O'Connor's
method directs attention away from the actual impact of government ac-
tion on the real community. Other judges following her approach have
on occasion been quite cavalier in their dismissal of citizens' genuine per-
ceptions of endorsement, calling them "hypersensitive" and "fastidious."
Feigenson, supra note 134, at 90 (footnotes omitted). Feigenson concludes from
his analysis that the endorsement test's extreme subjectivity has been counter-
productive, and "prevents the no endorsement principle from fulfilling what
should be its primary function by allowing the court to ignore 'outsiders" percep-
tions of government endorsement of religion." Id. at 93 (footnote omitted).
138. Leading Cases, supra note 4, at 237-38. The author notes that because the
test would fall prey to the same subjectivity problems as the endorsement test, Jus-
tice Kennedy's coercion analysis would allow unprecedented governmental sup-
port of, and affiliation with, religion. Id. The note argues that Justice Kennedy's
test would "enjoin a 'noncoercive acknowledgment' of any particular religion only
if it 'in fact establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so."' Id. (quoting
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). Thus, the author asserts thatJustice
Kennedy's coercion test threatens the very core of Establishment Clause signifi-
cance. Id.
139. Id. (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 228 (1986). Parish echoes
these criticisms, arguing that the coercion test is philosophically flawed. Parish,
supra note 7, at 272-73. He notes that the coercion test is no less ambiguous than
the endorsement test and the "effects" prong of Lemon, as it also requires an assess-
ment of a "reasonable observer." Id. at 273 n.130. In addition, Parish writes that
under the coercion analysis, "the Establishment Clause would merge with the Free
Exercise Clause if non-establishment stood for nothing more than non-coercion."
Id. at 272 (citing Lee, 505 U.S. at 621 (Souter, J., concurring)). Thus, because it
would be hard to construe a private religious display as actually forcing the public
to accept a particular religious belief or face a penalty, the coercion test would
effectively end most discussion regarding private religious displays. Id. at 271-72.
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tutional arena. 140 Responding to these ambiguous and misguided at-
tempts at Establishment Clause interpretation, the Capitol Square plurality
asserts a per se rule that is grounded in the intended meaning of the First
Amendment.14 1 The rule recognizes that the Establishment Clause was
140. The subjectivity of the standards employed by the Supreme Court has
resulted in a variety of holdings regarding Establishment Clause interpretation. See
generally McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1524 (1995) (hold-
ing that Ohio statutory provision prohibiting distribution of anonymous literature
violated First Amendment); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct.
2481, 2494 (1994) (determining that New York statute creating special school dis-
trict following village lines of community, incorporated to exclude all but its reli-
gious practitioners, violated Establishment Clause); Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (1993) (finding school district's refusal
to allow showing of religious film after school hours on district property unconsti-
tutional under First Amendment); Lee, 505 U.S. at 577 (establishing that public
school graduation practice of having nonsectarian prayers given by members of
clergy was unconstitutional for Establishment Clause purposes); Westside Commu-
nity Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253 (1990) (holding public high
school's refusal to allow students' religious club to meet in its facilities unconstitu-
tional); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 598 (finding creche displayed within county
courthouse to be in violation of Establishment Clause, while finding menorah dis-
played outside of courthouse, but on government property, to be constitutional);
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988) (holding that Act which authorized
federal funding for non-profit adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy counsel-
ing, some of which went to institutions with religious ties, did not violate Establish-
ment Clause); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 813 (1985) (finding government's policy of prohibiting solicitation at certain
functions constitutional); Grand Rapids Sch. Dist., 473 U.S. at 473 (holding that
district program which provided classes to nonpublic school students at public ex-
pense, and in classrooms leased from nonpublic schools, violated Establishment
Clause); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 61 (holding that state statute which provided for one
minute period of silence in public schools for meditation or prayer violated First
Amendment); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (holding that Christmas display owned by city
and displayed in public park did not violate Establishment Clause); Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983) (noting First Amend-
ment was not violated by school district's preferential inter-school mail system pol-
icy); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277 (finding state university's policy of excluding
religious organizations from building or grounds of university unconstitutional);
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 58-59 (1980) (finding state statute requiring posting
of copy of Ten Commandments on wall of each public school classroom violated
Establishment Clause); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (noting state
statute providing for salary supplement to be paid to underpaid teachers in non-
public schools unconstitutional); Everson v. Board of Educ. of the Township of
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1946) (finding school district's policy of reimbursing par-
ents for fares paid on public buses for transportation of children attending non-
public schools unconstitutional).
141. Justice Scalia wrote for the plurality, stating that "as a matter of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence, we have consistently held that it is no violation for
government to enact neutral policies that happen to benefit religion." Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2447 (1995). See, e.g.,
Bowen, 487 U.S. at 608 (finding that because some government program may bene-
fit religious organization, it does not necessarily violate constitution); Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Services for Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-89 (1986) (discussing
notion that government action is not automatically void because religious organi-,
zations may benefit from it in some way); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983);
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). The Establishment Clause, wrote
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intended to prevent the creation of a national church and federal prefer-
ence of one or more religious sects over another, while allowing for practica-
ble, nonpreferential assistance of religion. 142 As such, Capitol Squards per
Jutice Scalia, "was never meant, and has never been read by this Court, to serve as
an impediment to purely private religious speech; the Clause applies only to the
acts of government." Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2449 (emphasis added). For a
further discussion of the plurality's per se rule, see infra notes 142-44 and accom-
panying text.
142. In Capitol Square, the plurality's interpretation of the First Amendment is
supported by a historical analysis of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Ac-
cording to the "neutralists," or those advocating Jefferson's "wall of separation,"
the Supreme Court was correct in liberally interpreting the Establishment Clause.
Evans, supra note 2, at 41. Evans argues, however, that such a view is not supported
by a careful examination of the relevant historical sources. Id. Likewise, Bowen
asserts that the neutralists' wall of separation has created a definition of the word
establishment that greatly differs from the Framers' original understanding.
Bowen, supra note 21, at 133. Thus, if the Court had adopted an approach that
accurately reflected the Framers' intent, Bowen argues, "it would have obviated
much of the consequent establishment clause litigation, and would have left a
clearer, more durable framework for the resolution of subsequent establishment
clause controversies." Id. at 133-34.
The last significant and most ambitious effort by the Supreme Court to ana-
lyze the historical aspects of the Establishment Clause was Justice Rehnquist's dis-
senting opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist began, "lilt is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine
upon a mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the
Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted withJefferson's misleading met-
aphor for nearly 40 years." Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist
noted: First, thatJefferson was out of the country at the time the Bill of Rights was
ratified; and second, that Madison proposed the language which ultimately be-
came the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Id. at 92-94 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
At the time of ratification, delegates expressed their desire for a provision
prohibiting state sponsored religion. Id. at 95-96 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). At
the same time, however, they also sought to use language that would not be ex-
tremely "hurtful" towards religion generally. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). To
alleviate both of these concerns, Madison inserted into the Committee version the
word "national" before the word "religion," thinking that it would strike a balance
between the two extremes, with each compelling the other to conform. Id. at 96
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Although this did not appear in the final adopted ver-
sion, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the process demonstrates Madison's superior
role in the drafting of the Amendments. Id. at 97-98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
In support of this proposition, Justice Rehnquist cited Justice Joseph Story and
Justice Thomas Cooley, both of whom authored treatises espousing a similar view.
Id. at 104-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist asserted:
It seems indisputable from these glimpses of Madison's thinking, as re-
flected by actions on the floor of the House in 1789, that he saw the
Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national reli-
gion .... [and] did not see it as requiring neutrality on the part of gov-
ernment between religion and irreligion.
Id. at 98 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In light of this evidence, Justice Rehnquist
concluded:
It would seem from this evidence that the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment had acquired a well-accepted meaning: it forbade estab-
lishment of a national religion, and forbade preference among religious
19961 NOTE
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se rule acknowledges that the Establishment Clause was never intended to
serve as an impediment to purely private religious speech, connected to
the state only through its occurrence in a public forum.' 43 The plurality's
analysis in Capitol Square properly revisits the controlling intent and pur-
poses of the First Amendment, gleaning from this examination an appro-
priate and necessary rule for Establishment Clause interpretation.1 4 4
sects or denominations .... The Establishment Clause did not require
government neutrality between religion and irreligion nor did it prohibit
the Federal Government from providing nondiscriminatory aid to reli-
gion. There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the
Framers intended to build [a] "wall of separation."
Id. at 106 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
143. Bowen notes that the evolution of modern Establishment Clause juris-
prudence has produced a series of difficult burdens which have negatively im-
pacted upon all parties involved in Establishment Clause questions. Bowen, supra
note 21, at 159. These burdens include: (1) states burdened with the requirement
that they carefully avoid legislation that may benefit religion; (2) religions burdened
with the stigma created by Jefferson's wall; and (3) the Court burdened with the
difficult task of formulating a test to "support an establishment clause philosophy
that had become enslaved to Jefferson's metaphor." Id.
To escape these burdens created by the "Gordian Knot" of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, Bowen asserts that a scrupulous review should be conducted
of the House and Senate committee debates leading to the Clause's creation. Id.
at 157. A proper test derived from such an analysis, argues Bowen, would be one
that would "invalidate government action whose purpose supported the propaga-
tion of religion, but would permit such action that incidentally benefited religious
organizations." Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
Echoing this sentiment, Evans writes that a "detailed historical review into the
purpose and meaning of the establishment clause reveals that it was a federalism
compromise designed to ensure the rights of the states to legislate on matters of
religious import[;] ... there was no intent to prohibit the encouragement or fur-
therance by the federal government of religion by nonpreferentialist means." Ev-
ans, supra note 2, at 99.
144. After much examination, effort and the passage of time, the rule an-
nounced in Capitol Square has returned Establishment Clause jurisprudence to the
Constitution from whence it originated. From Justice Rehnquist's historical analy-
sis in Wallace v. Jaffree, to the dissent by Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, White and
Scalia in Allegheny County, and most recently, the dissent by Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia and Thomas in Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, the Court has
sought to break down the Jeffersonian "wall," and to reassert the constitutionality
of governmental accommodation of religion. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2505 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reasserting constitu-
tionality of government's accomodation of religion); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at
655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and in part; dissenting in part) (same);
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (same).
Justice Rehnquist expressed such a desire in Wallace, stating:
[T]he greatest injury of the "wall" notion is its mischievous diversion of
judges from the actual intentions of the drafters of the Bill of Rights. The
"crucible of litigation," . . . is well adapted to adjudicating factual disputes
on the basis of testimony presented in court, but no amount of repetition
of historical errors in judicial opinions can make errors true. The "wall of
separation between church and State" is a metaphor based on bad his-
tory, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should
be frankly and explicitly abandoned .... [The] Clause [does not] prohibit
[Vol. 41: p. 559
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Some judges and commentators argue against such per se formula-
tions, fearing that they are too rigid and uncompromising. 145 Such con-
cerns are unfounded, however, when the rule is supported by the
language of the Constitution and judicial precedent, and is narrowly tai-
lored to address a particular concern. 14 6 In fact, such arguments seem
Congress or the States from pursuing legitimate secular ends through
non-discriminatory means.
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Sharing a
similar sentiment in Allegheny County, Justice Kennedy concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, indicated:
Taken to its logical extreme, some of the language . .. [in our prior
cases] would require a relentless extirpation of all contact between gov-
ernment and religion. But that is not the history or the purpose of the
Establishment Clause. Government policies of accommodation, acknowl-
edgment, and support for religion are an accepted part of our political
and cultural heritage.
Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The Court's call to alter the current constitutional landscape of Establish-
ment Clause interpretation has been echoed most recently by Justice Scalia in
Board of Education ofKiryas v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 2505 (1994). Writing for the
dissent, Justice Scalia stated:
[T] he Founding Fathers would be astonished to find that the Establish-
ment Clause-which they designed "to insure that no one powerful sect
or combination of sects could use political or governmental power to
punish dissenters," . . . has been employed to prohibit characteristically
and admirably American accommodation of the religious practices (or
more precisely, cultural peculiarities) of a tiny minority set .... Once this
Court has abandoned text and history as guides, nothing prevents it from
calling religious toleration the establishment of religion.
Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2506 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citations omit-
ted). One commentator has noted that the Grumet Court "missed a good chance
to affirm an admirably American accommodation of religion." Seal, supra note
135, at 1676. The Supreme Court did not miss this chance in Capitol Square.
145. See, e.g., Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2454 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (ar-
guing that Establishment Clause inquiry cannot be distilled into fixed, per se rule);
id. at 2459-60 (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing that Allegheny's refusal to lay down
per se rule has been confirmed by subsequent precedent); Allegheny County, 492
U.S. at 629 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stipulating that endorsement test depends
upon sensitivity to unique circumstances and context of particular challenged
practice); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that each gov-
ernment practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine
whether it constitutes endorsement or disapproval of religion); see also Mergens, 496
U.S. at 262 (majority reaching its decision without applying irrebuttable presump-
tion); Marla A. DeGaetano, Making the Establishment Clause in Reasonable Observer
Cases More Reasonable, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 939, 954-58 (1993) (advocating percep-
tion and context based reasonable observer standard); Carl H. Esbeck, A Restate-
ment of the Supreme Court's Law of Religious Freedom: Coherence, Conflict, or Chaos?, 70
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 581, 586 (1995) (criticizing Lemon approach as too inflexible
and proposing multi-dimensional context-based perception standard); Steven B.
Goodman, Constitutional Law-Public Display of Religious Symbols and the Establishment
Clause-Doe v. Small, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 259, 274 (1992) (advocating content-based
contextual approach to Establishment Clause issues).
146. The rule asserted by Justice Scalia is derived directly from the Framers'
intent and purpose in drafting the First Amendment. For a discussion of the Fram-
ers' intent, see supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
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grossly misplaced in light of the confusion surrounding the current state
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 147 The plurality's per se rule in
Capitol Square offers a rare moment of clarity in First Amendment interpre-
tation and has taken a significant step toward altering the confusing land-
scape of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 14 8
In addition, its construction flows specifically from the Supreme Court's prior
precedent. Taken from the Court's prior holdings, the rule's assertions are four-
fold. First, that private religious speech is protected under the First Amendment
as secular private expression. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993). Second, that once a public forum is opened, a
state's right to limit protected expressive activity is sharply circumscribed, and per-
mitted only where such a restriction is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state
interest. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
Third, that an Establishment Clause violation is such a concern, as outlined above.
SeeWidmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). Fourth, that the Establishment Clause
cannot be violated by giving religious expression the same access to a public forum
that all other displays enjoy, as such exclusions must be reasonable and content-
neutral in accordance with the Free Speech and Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment. See Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Sch. Bd. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). For a discussion of
the plurality's reasoning, see supra notes 93-129 and accompanying text.
147. Each of the tests currently employed by the Supreme Court have fallen
prey to their own "subjectivity." For a discussion of the subjectivity that plagues
current Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see supra notes 130-40 and accompa-
nying text. As a result, this area of constitutional law is confused and without gui-
dance. For a discussion of the disarray caused by the standards currently employed
by the Court, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. A narrow, constitution-
ally grounded rule supported by judicial precedent seems the obvious and logical
answer. For a discussion of the per se rule outlined by Justice Scalia, see supra
notes 141-44 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the confusion surround-
ing Establishment Clause jurisprudence, see Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2481 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Alle-
gheny County, 492 U.S. at 573 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Evans, supra note 2; Leading Cases, supra note 4; Seal,
supra note 135.
148. See Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2440 (1995) (establishing a per se rule for
private religious speech in public fora). Responding to Justices Stevens, Souter
and O'Connor's criticisms of his holding in Capitol Square, Justice Scalia indicated
that they
[exile] private religious speech to a realm of less-protected expression
heretofore inhabited only by sexually explicit displays and commercial
speech .... It will be a sad day when this Court casts piety in with por-
nography, and finds the First Amendment more hospitable to private ex-
pletives .... than to private prayers. This would be merely bizarre were
religious speech simply as protected by the Constitution as other forms of
private speech; but it is outright perverse when one considers that private
religious expression receives preferential treatment under the Free Exer-
cise Clause. It is no answer to say that the Establishment Clause tempers
religious speech. By its terms that Clause applies only to the words and
acts of government. It was never meant, and has never been read by this
Court, to serve as an impediment to purely private religious speech con-
nected to the State only through its occurrence in a public forum.
Id. at 2449 (emphasis added) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Pub-
lic Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980); Young v. American Mini Theaters,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61, 70-71 (1976); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)).
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V. IMPACT
Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence has suffered
from a historical misinterpretation of the intent of the First Amendment, a
resulting bias against private religious expression in the public forum and
unclear, overly-subjective standards of review that are inherently unwork-
able.1 49 The practical result of this flawed rationale has been Supreme
Court inconsistency and federal court confusion.
1 50
Capitol Square represents a break from the majority analysis of the is-
sue, demonstrating that when grounded in a proper historical examina-
tion of the Framers' intent and supported by the application of judicial
precedent, a workable, constitutional and definitive standard for Establish-
ment Clause adjudication emerges.15 1 The question remains, however, as
to whether Capitol Squares per se rule for private religious expression in
the public forum will represent an emerging trend in cases of its kind.
15 2
149. For a discussion of the way in which Supreme Court Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has suffered from Constitutional misinterpretation and
flawed standards of review, see supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
150. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's inconsistency on the Establish-
ment Clause issue, as evidenced by their decisions, see supra note 3 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the federal court confusion, as evidenced by its
decisions resulting from the lack of guidance provided by the Supreme Court, see
supra note 4 and accompanying text.
151. For a discussion of the plurality's holding in Capitol Square and its per se
rule, see supra notes 93-129, 141-44 and accompanying text.
152. See, e.g., Creatore v. Town of Trumbull, 68 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating court's belief that lower courts must be guided by concurring opinions in
Capitol Square, yet unsure of how they would apply in this case). In Creatore, the
Second Circuit was faced with the issue of a creche being displayed on the town
green. Id. at 60.
A Christmas tree and a menorah had been placed on the town green of
Trumbull for the holiday season. Id. The tree was a permanent part of the green,
and was partly decorated for a lighting celebration by a private organization. Id.
The menorah on the other hand, was erected solely by a private group. Id. Peti-
tioner sought permission from the town to erect the creche. Id. His application
was ultimately rejected, however, on the grounds that "the creche would im-
permissably communicate a religious message." Id.
Citing the Second Circuit's previous decisions, the district court refused to
grant the petitioner's motion. Id.; see Chabad-Lubavitch of Vt. v. City of Burling-
ton, 936 F.2d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming holding of Kaplan); Kaplan v. City
of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing Allegheny County v. Greater
Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that erection of menorah in park
adjoining city hall would violate Establishment Clause in light of Allegheny County)).
The Second Circuit denied petitioner's appeal, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, but vacated the judgment and remanded it to the Second Circuit for
further consideration in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Capitol
Square. Creatore, 68 F.3d at 60.
The Second Circuit noted that no opinion in Capitol Square received a major-
ity of the votes. Id. at 61. The court further mentioned that only three justices
joined Part IV of Justice Scalia's opinion, which rejected the application of the
"endorsement test" utilized in Allegheny County. Id. As such, the Second Circuit
concluded that the "outcome" of Capitol Square turned on the factors articulated by
Justices O'Connor and Souter. Id. The Second Circuit therefore stipulated that
1996] NOTE 603
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Conflicting interpretations of Establishment Clause issues may persist as
long as members of the Court refuse to abandon the unwieldy Lemon, en-
dorsement and coercion analyses.15 3
In the future, however, as citizens and courts continue to suffer the
adverse effects of these flawed Establishment Clause interpretations, adop-
tion of Capitol Squards per se rule may result.1 54 Until then, courts will
continue to frustrate legitimate private religious expression with varying
interpretations of the Establishment, Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment. 15 5 Moreover, Jefferson's metaphoric
lower courts must be guided by these concurring opinions. Id. (citing American
Jewish Congress v. City of Beverly Hills, 65 F.3d 1539 (9th Cir. 1995), reh'g granted,
73 F.3d 970 (1996) (analyzing positions of justices in Allegheny County)).
The Second Circuit found that Justice O'Connor's endorsement test, focus-
ing on the "reasonable observer" who is deemed aware of the history and context
of the community and forum in which the religious display appears, controls the
inquiry. Id. (citing Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct. at 2455 (0' Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment)). The Second Circuit also noted Justice Sou-
ter's proposition that the "most narrowly drawn alternative" must have been used
in order for the exclusion to be constitutional. Id. (citing Capitol Square, 115 S. Ct.
at 2461 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
In making these assertions, the Second Circuit stated that Justices
O'Connor's and Souter's opinions are clear on the issue. Id. Nevertheless, the
court said that because it is uncertain as to how these opinions would apply to the
case at bar, it must remand it to the district court for further consideration. Id.
The Second Circuit asserted that it was better suited to "decide these issues and to
determine what, if any, restrictions should be placed on the display of the criche."
Id.
153. As demonstrated by the analysis of this Note, old habits and standards of
review die hard in the Supreme Court. For instance, even though the Lemon test
has been the subject of volumes of criticism, Lemon was cited by name in a
Supreme Court opinion as recently as 1993. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993) (establishing that school district
property used to exhibit film sponsored by church was not establishment of reli-
gion under Lemon).
Indeed, the Court in Creatore is extremely hesitant to depart with the much
used, yet much criticized "endorsement standard." Creatore, 68 F.3d at 60-61. As
such, the Second Circuit's holding is merely indicative of the problems facing a
movement for change in the Establishment Clause arena.
154. As the Creatore court points out, Justice Scalia's rejection of the endorse-
ment test was joined by only three other justices in Capitol Square-Justices Rehn-
quist, Kennedy and Thomas. Creatore, 68 F.3d at 61. In light of the uphill battle
facing any alteration of a judicial standard in the Supreme Court, much less a
"feared" per se rule, it may take an additional vote to gain not only a majority, but
perhaps also, legitimacy in the eyes of the courts. If dissatisfaction with current
Establishment Clause jurisprudence continues to grow amongst litigants and the
lower courts, however, a process of wider acceptance could occur sooner rather
than later.
155. For a discussion concerning the ways in which current Establishment
Clause standards frustrate legitimate religious expression, see supra notes 130-40
and accompanying text.
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wall of separation will continue to cloud and skew Establishment Clause
adjudication. 156
Ryan W. Decker
156. "The 'wall of separation between church and State' is a metaphor based
on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It
should be frankly and explicitly abandoned." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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